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Abstract. Groundwater is one of the world’s most important natural resources, and its
importance will increase as climate change continues and the human population grows.
But groundwater management has traditionally been governed by lax and uneven legal
regimes. To the extent those regimes exist, they tend to focus on the extraction of
groundwater rather than the processes—referred to as groundwater recharge—through
which water enters the subsurface. Yet groundwater recharge is crucially important to the
maintenance of groundwater supplies, and it is also highly susceptible to human
influences, particularly through our pervasive manipulation of land uses.
This Article discusses the underdeveloped law of groundwater recharge. It explains why
groundwater-recharge law, or the lack thereof, is important; it discusses existing legal
doctrines that affect groundwater recharge, occasionally by design but usually
inadvertently; and it explains how more intentional and effective systems of
groundwater-recharge law can be constructed. It also sets forth criteria for judging when
regulation of groundwater recharge will make sense, and it argues that a communitarian
ethic, rather than the currently prevalent laissez-faire approaches, should underpin those
regulatory approaches. Finally, it suggests using regulatory fees as a key (but not exclusive)
instrument of groundwater-recharge regulation.

* Harry D. Sunderland Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the
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Introduction
Every day, around the world, billions of people rely on water pumped
from wells.1 They do so because groundwater is an extraordinarily useful
resource. It is available over broad areas; even in landscapes where surfacewater streams are few and far between, many people can access groundwater
simply by drilling a well.2 Because some contaminants filter out as water
moves through the subsurface, groundwater is often cleaner than surface
water.3 And because groundwater usually flows slowly and evaporates only
minimally,4 groundwater storage can often last much longer than surfacewater storage; groundwater therefore can remain available even during
extended droughts. These benefits extend to ecological systems as well as
human extractive users.5 Because groundwater tends to be cleaner, cooler, and
more steadily available than surface runoff, it plays a crucial role in sustaining
many rivers, streams, wetlands, and lakes.6
1. For statistics, see Facts About Global Groundwater Usage, NAT’L GROUND WATER ASS’N,

https://perma.cc/PAH9-EWWZ (archived Mar. 8, 2021). In 2015, the U.S. Geological
Survey estimated that 115 million people in the United States alone rely on
groundwater for drinking water. The Quality of the Nation’s Groundwater, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURV. (Jan. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/9HHD-8AGP; see also Mark
Giordano, Global Groundwater? Issues and Solutions, 34 ANN. REV. ENV’T & RES. 153, 154
(2009). Giordano explains:
There is no question that the use of groundwater has brought astounding benefits to literally
billions of people. Probably the majority of the world’s cities rely to some degree on
groundwater for urban water supply, and it could be argued that groundwater in part enabled
the global urbanization phenomena we are now witnessing. No less spectacularly, large-scale
agricultural groundwater use has brought massive benefits to legions of small, poor (or
previously poor) farmers, particularly in Asia.

Id.
2. See Giordano, supra note 1, at 155.
3. Id.
4. See id; Peter Dillon & Muhammad Arshad, Managed Aquifer Recharge in Integrated Water

Resource Management, in INTEGRATED GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS,
APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES 435, 445 (Anthony J. Jakeman et al. eds., 2016) (describing
losses as high as 35% to 45% of stored surface water due to evaporation). But see E.
Balugani et al., Groundwater and Unsaturated Zone Evaporation and Transpiration in a
Semi-arid Open Woodland, 547 J. HYDROLOGY 54, 54-55 (2017) (noting that the lowevaporation assumption, though common, is probably incorrect and can lead to
overestimation of recharge).
5. See Derek Eamus et al., Groundwater Dependent Ecosystems: Classification, Identification
Techniques and Threats, in INTEGRATED GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT, supra note 4, at
313, 317-18 (describing types of groundwater-dependent ecosystems).
6. See generally Masaki Hayashi & Donald O. Rosenberry, Effects of Groundwater Exchange
on the Hydrology and Ecology of Surface Waters, 43 J. GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 327,
330-31 (2001) (describing flow patterns and temperature effects); S.D. Keesstra et al., Soil
as a Filter for Groundwater Quality, 4 CURRENT OP. ENV’T SUSTAINABILITY 507 (2012)
(describing the filtration function of soils and variables affecting pollutant filtering).
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Despite its value, groundwater is often ignored, misunderstood, or taken
for granted, and inattention often goes hand in hand with unsustainable
exploitation.7 Consequently, groundwater supplies in the United States and
around the world are being depleted, in some places with alarming speed.8
That depletion is already leading to shortages, which are likely to spread and
intensify as a growing global population uses more water and as climate
change accelerates water stress.9 The human costs of these crises can be
immense.10 So, too, are the environmental consequences; many surface
waterways would not flow, and some have already ceased flowing, without
inflows from groundwater.11
Yet even as groundwater resources come under growing strain, many
people are eyeing groundwater as an increasingly important source of future
supply.12 Their reasons are straightforward: We must get water from
somewhere, and in a warming world, with more droughts and less water
precipitating as snow, less surface water will be available in many places,
particularly during warmer and dryer seasons.13 Water managers might
compensate for increasingly erratic flows by building more dams and surface
reservoirs, but in many areas, few good dam sites remain.14 Dam construction
and operation are also expensive and environmentally destructive, and much
7. See Dave Owen, Taking Groundwater, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 253, 255 (2013).
8. See M. Rodell et al., Emerging Trends in Global Freshwater Availability, 557 NATURE 651,

9.

10.
11.

12.
13.
14.

655 (2018) (describing accelerating drawdown in California’s Central Valley); Steven
M. Gorelick & Chunmiao Zheng, Introduction to a Special Edition, Global Change and
the Groundwater Management Challenge, 51 WATER RES. RSCH. 3031, 3031 (2015); J.S.
Famiglietti, Commentary, The Global Groundwater Crisis, 4 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
945, 946 (2014).
See Blanca E. Jiménez Cisneros & Taikan Oki, Freshwater Resources, in
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS,
ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY; PART A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS 229, 241
(Field et al. eds., 2014), https://perma.cc/2JNQ-A8LS (describing projections of
increased irrigation demand due to population and economic growth, as well as climate
change).
See Owen, supra note 7, at 305 n.319 (citing sources describing how groundwater
shortages contribute to human conflicts, including the civil war in Syria).
See THOMAS C. WINTER ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., CIRCULAR 1139, GROUND
WATER AND SURFACE WATER: A SINGLE RESOURCE 8-10 (reprt. 1999) (explaining
interconnections between groundwater and surface flows); Famiglietti, supra note 8, at
947 (“Many of the world’s largest rivers, for example, the Colorado, Indus, Murray and
Yellow rivers, no longer reach the ocean, because of excessive water use and
overallocation, including overpumping of groundwater.”).
See Richard G. Taylor et al., Ground Water and Climate Change, 3 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 322, 324 (2013) (describing projected increases in demand for groundwater).
See Timothy R. Green et al., Beneath the Surface of Global Change: Impacts of Climate
Change on Groundwater, 405 J. HYDROLOGY 532, 539-40 (2011).
See Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REV. 641, 697 & n.371 (1999).
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of the water stored behind dams evaporates before it can be used.15 Turning to
groundwater—which often can be stored for longer periods, with lower
evaporation losses and with less environmental impact—seems like an
appealing alternative.16
These water-supply crises and opportunities are intertwined with legal
challenges. The challenges arise partly from the physical nature of
groundwater. Because groundwater moves in response to pumping, wells in
one area can drain water from beneath neighboring lands,17 generating
conflicts between neighbors. At broader scales, groundwater’s tendency to flow
across property lines makes it a common-pool resource and creates the
potential for a classic tragedy of the commons.18 Some combination of
property rights and regulatory governance is a standard response to such
potential tragedies, and consequently, groundwater extraction is governed by
common law water rights, legislation, and administrative regulations.19 These
systems are often underdeveloped;20 even in the United States, regulation of
groundwater pumping has lagged behind regulation of surface-water use, and
groundwater laws often provide spotty and ineffective coverage.21
Nevertheless, for groundwater pumping, the overall trend is toward more
pervasive and sophisticated regulation.22

15. See COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF RECOVERABLE WATER, NAT’L

16.
17.

18.
19.
20.

21.
22.

RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., PROSPECTS FOR MANAGED UNDERGROUND
STORAGE OF RECOVERABLE WATER 13-15 (2008).
See id. at 15.
See ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR
COLLECTIVE ACTION 107 (1990) (“Water underlying any parcel of land . . . can be siphoned
to a neighbor’s land . . . .”).
See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Essay, Tragically Difficult: The Obstacles to Governing the
Commons, 30 ENV’T L. 241, 246, 250 (2000) (“[G]roundwater is . . . a natural commons.”).
See generally Owen, supra note 7, at 266-71 (describing groundwater law).
See Famiglietti, supra note 8, at 946 (“[G]roundwater is often poorly monitored and
managed. In the developing world, oversight is often non-existent.”); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Beyond Connections: Pursuing Multidimensional Conjunctive Management,
47 IDAHO L. REV. 273, 274 (2011) (describing “lax legal rules and poor enforcement”).
See Owen, supra note 7, at 266-71.
See id. at 268-69; see also, e.g., Tina Cannon Leahy, Desperate Times Call for Sensible
Measures: The Making of the California Sustainable Groundwater Management Act, 9
GOLDEN GATE U. ENV’T L. REV. 5, 8-11 (2015) (chronicling the emergence of statewide
groundwater-use regulation in California).
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Figure
Near-Surface Hydrology

Source: M.W. Toews, Conceptual Diagram of Near-Surface Hydrology (2007),
https://perma.cc/96T9-6ELN.

As shown in the Figure above, however, pumping groundwater out of the
ground is only one part of the groundwater cycle. Before groundwater is
available to pump, it needs to get into the ground, which happens through a
process known as groundwater recharge.23 Groundwater recharge involves
water infiltrating through the ground surface, percolating downward through
unsaturated soil or rock, and then hitting the water table—that is, the level
below which the pore spaces in subsurface soil or rock are filled with water
rather than air.24
Despite its crucial role in water cycles, groundwater recharge has not
received much legal attention.25 There are obvious reasons why groundwater
23. See WINTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
24. See C.W. FETTER, APPLIED HYDROGEOLOGY 5 (4th ed. 2001). This description assumes

that the water percolates to a shallow, unconfined aquifer. Where confining layers—
which are subsurface layers that limit water flow—exist, recharge processes are more
complicated. See Aquifers and Groundwater, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://perma.cc/
3VP7-SQHV (archived Mar. 8, 2021).
25. See Thompson, supra note 20, at 301 (“States also historically ignored the important
connection between land use and land cover, on the one hand, and groundwater
footnote continued on next page
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recharge is not a noticeable process; we usually do not see water’s subterranean
movements, and most people don’t ponder where water goes when the ground
surface dries up.26 Additionally, recharge is a natural, gravity-driven process.
In many places, water does not need legal assistance to move downward.
Nevertheless, the locations and rates at which recharge occurs are heavily
affected by pervasive human manipulation of the ground surface, and those
human manipulations in turn are partially determined by law.
Human impacts on groundwater recharge take a variety of forms. Over
much of the earth’s land surface, humans determine what vegetation grows,
and increasing the amount of water consumed by plants typically means
reducing infiltration deeper into the ground.27 People also decide where roads,
buildings, and other impervious surfaces are constructed, and impervious
surfaces control whether precipitation flows over or through the ground
surface.28 We move massive quantities of irrigation water, and some excess
irrigation water becomes recharge.29 Our often-antiquated systems for
delivering water—for both agricultural and urban use—leak into the ground.30
We constrain the movements of surface water, building levees that limit
flooding and, therefore, limit the infiltration of surface water into areas
adjacent to rivers and streams.31 All of these manipulations of the land surface
and the water cycle are at least partly the products of property rights, planning
processes, permits, subsidies, and other regulatory decisionmaking, which

26.

27.

28.
29.

30.
31.

recharge and quality, on the other.”). The attention recharge does receive generally
focuses on managed aquifer recharge (MAR), which usually involves diverting water
from a river or stream during high-flow periods and injecting it into aquifers. I discuss
managed aquifer recharge in more depth in Part II.D below.
This is true of groundwater more generally. See Daniel L. Dickerson et al., Groundwater
in Science Education, 18 J. SCI. TCHR. EDUC. 45, 46 (2006) (noting that students and science
educators alike generally don’t know much about groundwater).
See Vildan Sahin & Michael J. Hall, The Effects of Afforestation and Deforestation on Water
Yields, 178 J. HYDROLOGY 293, 303-04 (1996) (finding that increasing forest cover
generally reduces water yields); cf. Bernt Matheussen et al., Effects of Land Cover Change
on Streamflow in the Interior Columbia River Basin (USA and Canada), 14 HYDROLOGICAL
PROCESSES 867, 868 (2000) (“Removal of forest cover is known to increase streamflow as
a result of reduced evapotranspiration and to increase peak flows as a result of higher
water tables.”).
See Emily S. Bernhardt & Margaret A. Palmer, Restoring Streams in an Urbanizing World,
52 FRESHWATER BIOLOGY 738, 739-40 (2007).
See Bridget R. Scanlon et al., Impact of Land Use and Land Cover Change on Groundwater
Recharge and Quality in the Southwestern US, 11 GLOB. CHANGE BIOLOGY 1577, 1586 (2005)
(finding much higher recharge rates in irrigated areas).
David Schaper, As Infrastructure Crumbles, Trillions of Gallons of Water Lost, NPR
(Oct. 29, 2014, 6:06 PM ET), https://perma.cc/23NQ-3FBK.
See Jeffrey J. Opperman et al., Sustainable Floodplains Through Large-Scale Reconnection to
Rivers, 326 SCIENCE 1487, 1488 (2009) (identifying groundwater recharge as a benefit of
floodplains).
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means that groundwater recharge is partially determined by law. Yet law’s
effects on groundwater recharge have received little attention from
policymakers and academic researchers.
This Article begins to fill that gap, addressing the United States’ laws at the
intersection of land use and groundwater recharge. It begins, in Part I, with a
primer on how groundwater recharge works and how humans influence
groundwater-recharge processes. Part I also explains why attention to
groundwater recharge has become increasingly important and how climate
change is likely to further increase that importance in years to come. Part II
then turns to traditional legal doctrines governing the quantity of
groundwater recharge.32 It describes a hodgepodge of doctrines, many of which
affect recharge without any underlying plan or design, and none of which
seem matched for an era in which water managers increasingly call for
carefully planned uses of groundwater.
Part III considers the future of groundwater-recharge law. More
specifically, it turns to three basic questions that legal regimes for groundwater
recharge must address. The first question is whether more robust regulation of
groundwater recharge makes sense at all. In some places, the answer to that
question will be yes, while in others, those systems would be more trouble than
they are worth. Part III offers criteria for judging which is which. The second
question is what sort of ethic should underpin a system of groundwaterrecharge law. Any system of natural-resource regulation (or nonregulation)
reflects judgments, often implicit, about our appropriate relationships with the
natural world and with each other. Part III exposes the laissez-faire judgments
inherent in existing law and explains how a more communitarian ethic would
provide a foundation for better legal regimes. The third and final question is
what regulatory instruments a more robust system of groundwater-recharge
law should employ. There are many possibilities: Property-based regimes,
informational regulation, planning, performance standards, prohibitions, and
32. Laws protecting groundwater from recharged pollution are more extensive than laws

governing the amount of groundwater supply. Hazardous-waste laws like both the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act are designed partly to keep pollutants out
of groundwater. See Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94580, 90 Stat. 2975 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987); Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510,
94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 33, and 42 U.S.C.). The
Clean Water Act does so as well, though only in circumstances where discharges to
surface water through groundwater are the “functional equivalent” of direct discharges
to surface water. See County of Maui v. Haw. Wildlife Fund, 140 S. Ct. 1462, 1468 (2020).
Some states also have laws or regulations designed to protect aquifers from
contaminated recharge. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-354g to -354p (2021)
(providing a program to protect aquifers from contamination); MD. CODE
REGS. 26.08.02.09 (2021) (requiring state approval of discharges into aquifers).
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financial incentives all might have roles to play. But Part III suggests particular
attention to mechanisms that use impact fees to encourage better groundwater
management and to create pools of money to support selective governmental
interventions.
In some ways, answering these questions requires delving into the unique
science and policy of an often-ignored hydrologic process. But in other ways,
groundwater-recharge regulation presents a microcosm of problems that recur
all along the frontiers of environmental and natural-resource law.
Groundwater-recharge law remains underdeveloped partly because of data
gaps and limited understanding, and similar limits and gaps challenge many
areas of environmental and natural-resource regulation.33 Groundwaterrecharge problems often arise from the cumulative effects of many individual
landowners’ actions, rather than from a few readily identified and easily
targeted actors.34 This, too, creates challenges that often arise both within and
beyond the environmental field.35 Finally, groundwater-recharge management
can create difficult tradeoffs among different policy goals, and the challenge of
managing difficult tradeoffs again helps define environmental and naturalresource law.36 Although every regulatory challenge is unique in some ways,
these commonalities mean that a study of groundwater recharge can draw
lessons from, and shed light upon, regulatory challenges that cut across the
environmental field.
I.

Groundwater Recharge and the Water Cycle

Groundwater is crucially important to humans and to natural systems. But
it can fulfill that importance only if it somehow gets into the aquifers from
which it is later pumped or from which it discharges into surface waterways.
In many places, much of that infiltration occurred millennia ago;37 some
presently arid regions have large aquifers that formed from the melting of iceage glaciers or during times when the climate was much wetter than it is
today.38 But in many areas, at least some of the water people pump from the
33. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
35. See Dave Owen, Critical Habitat and the Challenge of Regulating Small Harms, 64 FLA L.

REV. 141, 143-44 (2012).
36. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit

Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651, 1653 (2001) (listing examples of unintended
tradeoffs created by risk regulation).
37. See Scott Jasechko et al., Global Aquifers Dominated by Fossil Groundwaters but Wells
Vulnerable to Modern Contamination, 10 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 425, 426 (2017).
38. See, e.g., Jane Braxton Little, The Ogallala Aquifer: Saving a Vital U.S. Water Source, SCI.
AM. (Mar. 1, 2009), https://perma.cc/V5H9-NY7J; Bridget R. Scanlon et al., Global
footnote continued on next page
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ground was above the ground surface not so long ago, and it infiltrated
through processes whose unabated continuation is by no means assured. This
Part explains the pathways that water follows as it reaches subsurface aquifers
and the many ways in which human activity can impede or accelerate
movement along those paths.
A. Natural Water Cycles
Imagine, for a moment, a rainstorm falling onto a forest. Particularly in
summer, when leaves are out, the forest canopy will intercept some of that
rain.39 Of the rain that does reach the ground surface, some will evaporate, and,
if the rainstorm is large or the ground is already saturated, some will flow
laterally over the ground surface, perhaps continuing to flow until it reaches
wetlands or streams.40 Water that does not evaporate or flow overland will
continue its downward journey and will percolate through layers of leaves and
duff and into the soil.41 Along the way, much of it will be taken up by plants’
root systems, particularly during growing seasons, and some will linger as soil
moisture in the unsaturated zone.42 Water that is in excess of plants’ needs, or
that root systems cannot intercept, will percolate further down, moving
through pore spaces—and, in bedrock, through networks of fractures—until it
reaches the water table.43
In other natural landscapes, similar processes occur, though the amount
and locations of infiltration can be different. In desert landscapes, water
movement through moisture-starved soils may be limited, and almost all
precipitation evaporates or is transpired.44 Consequently, over much of an arid

39.

40.
41.
42.
43.

44.

Synthesis of Groundwater Recharge in Semiarid and Arid Regions, 20 HYDROLOGICAL
PROCESSES 3335, 3349-50 (2006) (describing the origins of aquifers beneath the Sahara
Desert).
See COMM. ON REDUCING STORMWATER DISCHARGE CONTRIBUTIONS TO WATER
POLLUTION, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., URBAN STORMWATER
MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 131 (2009), https://perma.cc/NT4D-TBXQ.
FETTER, supra note 24, at 37-39.
See id. at 38-39.
See id. at 28-30; see Unsaturated Flow Basics, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://perma.cc/
WY64-A2MD (last updated Jan. 2013).
See FETTER, supra note 24, at 94; Aquifer Basics: Igneous and Metamorphic-Rock Aquifers,
U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://perma.cc/HZT2-RGD9 (last updated Dec. 28, 2016)
(describing water movement through secondary porosity). These processes are more
complicated where confining layers—which are layers of impermeable subsurface
material, like clay or nonporous bedrock—constrain the vertical movement of water.
See supra note 24.
See E.G. Jobbágy et al., Water Subsidies from Mountains to Deserts: Their Role in Sustaining
Groundwater-Fed Oases in a Sandy Landscape, 21 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 678, 679
(2011) (noting the absence of recharge in most arid landscapes).
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landscape, little groundwater recharge will occur.45 But where surface runoff
concentrates in ephemeral streams or wetlands, substantial volumes of water
can percolate down to the water table.46 Concentrated recharge also may occur
where streams emerge from mountain ranges and enter valleys filled with sand
and boulders, much like water that disappears after it is poured from a bucket
onto a sandy beach.47 Over time, these processes can accumulate huge volumes
of groundwater, even in areas where the ground surface usually looks bone
dry.48
As these examples illustrate, recharge occurs differently across different
landscape types. Recharge rates also tend to be heterogeneous across smaller
spatial distances, across seasons, and across different types of precipitation
events. Several factors drive that heterogeneity. One factor is vegetation’s
demand for water.49 That demand can vary significantly within and between
landscape types.50 It also can vary seasonally, particularly in temperate
landscapes where winter halts most plant growth.51 A second key factor is the
permeability of soil and bedrock, which also can be heterogeneous across small
spatial scales.52 A third key factor is the duration and intensity of storms.53
Brief, low-intensity storms may do little more than wet the ground surface and
will often produce little infiltration.54 Higher-intensity rainstorms can
45. See id.
46. See Jacobus J. de Vries & Ian Simmers, Groundwater Recharge: An Overview of Processes

47.
48.
49.
50.

51.
52.

53.
54.

and Challenges, 10 HYDROGEOLOGY J. 5, 8 (2002) (describing focused-recharge zones in
desert landscapes—but also noting that alluvial soils and riparian vegetation can
impede recharge); Warren W. Wood et al., Quantifying Macropore Recharge: Examples
from a Semi-arid Area, 35 GROUNDWATER 1097, 1098 (1997) (describing recharge
through cracks in the clay in playa basins).
See FETTER, supra note 24, at 291-93.
See, e.g., Jobbágy et al., supra note 44, at 689 (describing substantial contributions from
mountains to recharge in adjacent arid plains).
See, e.g., Scanlon et al., supra note 38, at 3350-51 (describing substantial recharge
increases in nonvegetated and de-vegetated areas).
See, e.g., W.R. Dripps & K.R. Bradbury, The Spatial and Temporal Variability of
Groundwater Recharge in a Forested Basin in Northern Wisconsin, 24 HYDROLOGICAL
PROCESSES 383, 386-90 (2009).
See Scott Jasechko et al., The Pronounced Seasonality of Global Groundwater Recharge, 50
WATER RES. RSCH. 8845, 8846 (2014) (describing seasonal variation and its causes).
See Andreas Hartmann et al., Enhanced Groundwater Recharge Rates and Altered Recharge
Sensitivity to Climate Variability Through Subsurface Heterogeneity, 114 PNAS 2842, 2842
(2017) (“Subsurface heterogeneity notably affects groundwater recharge . . . .”).
See Arik M. Tashie et al., Identifying Long-Term Empirical Relationships Between Storm
Characteristics and Episodic Groundwater Recharge, 52 WATER RES. RSCH. 21, 22 (2016).
See id. (“For infiltration to occur, precipitation must first exceed interception by the
vegetation canopy. Subsequently, for infiltration to contribute to recharge, the soil
must be wetted enough to allow vertical drainage below the root zone . . . .”).
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produce more infiltration,55 but they also may deliver that precipitation faster
than the ground can absorb it, which means a lower percentage of the storm’s
precipitation will infiltrate into the ground.56 In short, in many landscapes,
levels of recharge can vary significantly over both space and time.
B. Human Influences
In a variety of ways, humans affect these processes of groundwater
recharge. Indeed, each of the key variables described above is highly susceptible
to human influence. And that influence is pervasive. Leaving aside the driest
desert areas, where little precipitation occurs anyway,57 and tundra and taiga
regions, humans have developed, farmed, grazed, deforested, or reforested most
of the earth’s terrestrial landscapes.58 Groundwater recharge therefore has
entered what some scientists call the Anthropocene Epoch, when
environmental processes are rarely free of human influence.59
The most obvious way in which humans manipulate groundwater
recharge is through the development of land surfaces. Human development
usually brings impervious surfaces—typically roofs and pavement—to
landscapes where vegetation and soils previously were present.60 These
impervious surfaces block recharge, and in urban landscapes, stormwater tends
to flow over the ground surface rather than entering the ground.61 At modest
levels of precipitation and modest levels of urbanization, these changes might
not alter recharge levels much. Gravity is persistent, and stormwater that
would have infiltrated on one parcel may simply flow to the next parcel and
infiltrate there. But as urbanization levels increase or as storms become
larger—or both—flows intercepted by impervious surfaces may overwhelm
the capacity of the pervious areas that remain.62 A common consequence is
flooding, and most cities therefore build networks of storm drains that convey
55. See id. (summarizing studies finding that in some landscapes, most recharge occurs

during heavy-storm events).
56. Id.
57. Because of imported irrigation water or fossil aquifers, even highly arid areas may be
58.

59.
60.
61.
62.

farmed and thus may be sites for groundwater recharge.
Andrew P. Jacobson et al., Global Areas of Low Human Impact (“Low Impact Areas”) and
Fragmentation of the Natural World, SCI. REPS., Oct. 2, 2019, at 1, 3 & fig.1, 4 & fig.2; Roger
LeB. Hooke et al., Land Transformation by Humans: A Review, GSA TODAY, Dec. 2012, at
4, 6 (showing summary data).
See Colin N. Waters et al., The Anthropocene Is Functionally and Stratigraphically Distinct
from the Holocene, 351 SCIENCE 137, 138 (2016).
See Bernhardt & Palmer, supra note 28, at 738-40.
See id. at 740.
See Shiqiang Du et al., Quantifying the Impact of Impervious Surface Location on Flood Peak
Discharge in Urban Areas, 76 NAT. HAZARDS 1457, 1458 (2015).
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surface flows directly into waterways, bypassing the aquifers through which
much of the stormwater would otherwise pass.63 These stormwater flows
create major pollution problems, for urban stormwater gathers cocktails of
pollutants as it passes over the ground surface.64 The interruption of
infiltration also can reduce aquifer recharge, sometimes significantly.65
Humans also influence recharge by managing vegetation.66 Farming is one
obvious example. Anywhere people introduce crops, they affect recharge
levels, and whether they are increasing or decreasing those levels depends
upon whether the crops demand more water than the vegetation they replace,
whether a plowed or otherwise manipulated ground surface is more or less
porous than a native landscape, and whether the farmers irrigate their plants.67
Logging has similar effects.68 Introduction of non-native species, either as
cultivated plants or as unwanted invaders, also can affect recharge.69 And even
in landscapes that might appear natural, human choices have profound effects
63. See Dave Owen, Urbanization, Water Quality, and the Regulated Landscape, 82 U. COLO. L.

REV. 431, 441 (2011).
64. See id. at 441-42.
65. See Chester L. Arnold, Jr. & C. James Gibbons, Impervious Surface Coverage: The

66.

67.
68.

69.

Emergence of a Key Environmental Indicator, 62 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 243, 244-45 (1996). But
see Dongmei Han et al., Alterations to Groundwater Recharge Due to Anthropogenic
Landscape Change, 554 J. HYDROLOGY 545, 549 (2017) (noting that impervious surfaces
can also increase recharge by concentrating surface flows). Other changes associated
with urbanization—particularly reductions in vegetation levels, increases in imported
irrigation water, and leaking pipes—can offset the impacts of impervious surfaces, and
in urban areas that don’t rely on groundwater pumping, the loss of recharge caused by
impervious surfaces may not be problematic (it may even prevent problematically
high groundwater levels). See generally John M. Sharp, Jr., The Impacts of Urbanization on
Groundwater Systems and Recharge, AQUA MUNDI, June 2010, at 53-55 (describing the
variety of ways in which urbanization can promote as well as inhibit recharge). But if
an urban area does rely on groundwater pumping, or could do so, this lost recharge can
be a significant problem.
See Tashie et al., supra note 53, at 21 (“[M]any studies have found large increases in
average annual recharge by the conversion of forests and shrubs to crops and
grasses . . . .”). This relationship does not always exist, however. See id. at 22 (noting
other studies that found that deforestation reduced recharge levels).
See Han et al., supra note 65, at 546; Scanlon et al., supra note 38, at 3350-52 (providing
examples).
See U. Ilstedt et al., Intermediate Tree Cover Can Maximize Groundwater Recharge in the
Seasonally Dry Tropics, SCI. REPS., Feb. 24, 2016, at 1, 1 (describing the “dominant
paradigm” that forest cover decreases groundwater recharge).
See, e.g., NATURE CONSERVANCY & WATER FUNDS FOR AFR., THE GREATER CAPE TOWN
WATER FUND: ASSESSING THE RETURN ON INVESTMENT FOR ECOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
RESTORATION 8, 19-22 (2019), https://perma.cc/Y6TB-Z8D5 (describing invasive-species
impacts in the Cape Town area, which recently experienced massive drought);
Kimberly Burnett et al., Economic Lessons from Control Efforts for an Invasive Species:
Miconia calvescens in Hawaii, 13 J. FOREST ECON. 151, 158 (2007) (describing an invasive
species that could cause massive recharge depletion in Hawaii).
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on vegetation levels and therefore on groundwater recharge. The United
States’ forests, for example, have been heavily affected by fire-management
practices, not just in the modern Smokey Bear era of fire suppression but also
during the precolonial era, when Native American tribes used fire to produce
better landscapes in which to gather and hunt.70 Such fire-management
practices influence the amount of vegetation present in forests and, therefore,
the balance of transpiration and recharge.71
Human decisions also affect the places where large volumes of water
gather, and therefore where concentrated infiltration occurs. This happens in
several ways. Developers and farmers drain or fill streams and wetlands, thus
forcing water onto other parts of the landscape, where infiltration may occur
to different extents.72 Through their attempts to control floods, engineers
often limit streams and rivers to narrow paths, isolating them from floodplains
that might otherwise serve as infiltration zones.73 Pipes leak, often heavily, and
that leaked water becomes groundwater.74 Local governments also must
70. See Scott L. Stephens & Neil G. Sugihara, Fire Management and Policy Since European

71.

72.

73.

74.

Settlement, in FIRE IN CALIFORNIA’S ECOSYSTEMS 431, 431-34 (Neil G. Sugihara et al. eds.,
2006).
See generally Bharat Sharma Acharya et al., Woody Plant Encroachment Impacts on
Groundwater Recharge: A Review, WATER, Oct. 17, 2018, at 1 (describing the varying
influences of forest composition upon groundwater recharge); M.L. Wine & D. Cadol,
Hydrologic Effects of Large Southwestern USA Wildfires Significantly Increase Regional
Water Supply: Fact or Fiction?, ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Aug. 18, 2016, at 1 (concluding that
the answer is fact, for two of the three studied watersheds); Alicia M. Kinoshita & Terri
S. Hogue, Increased Dry Season Water Yield in Burned Watersheds in Southern California,
ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS, Jan. 5, 2015, at 1, 7-8.
See, e.g., Lisa A. McCauley et al., Land Use and Wetland Drainage Affect Water Levels and
Dynamics of Remaining Wetlands, ECOSPHERE, June 2015, at 1, 10 (describing connections
between wetland filling, groundwater recharge, and flooding). While these
relationships exist, in some places they may not matter to regional-scale groundwater
storage. See Garth van der Kamp & Masaki Hayashi, The Groundwater Recharge Function
of Small Wetlands in the Semi-arid Northern Prairies, 8 GREAT PLAINS RSCH. 39, 49-50
(1998) (finding that wetland draining may lower local water tables but have minimal
impact on regional aquifers).
See OFF. OF RSCH. & DEV., U.S. EPA, EPA/600/R-14/475F, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS &
WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE 3-11 to -12 (2015), https://perma.cc/PG52-QAML.
See Han et al., supra note 65, at 548. The authors explain:
If water supply to a newly urbanized area is sourced from outside the immediate catchment
and is distributed by a pressurized mains network, this creates a new potential source of
recharge, via pipeline leakages. Such inter-basin water transfer associated with urban
development can have huge impacts on water balances and lead to enhanced recharge and
rising water tables.

Id. (citations omitted); see also, e.g., B. Garcia-Fresca, Urban-Enhanced Groundwater
Recharge: Review and Case Study of Austin, Texas, USA, in URBAN GROUNDWATER:
MEETING THE CHALLENGE 3, 7-8, 13-14 (Ken W.F. Howard ed., 2007).
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choose between disposing of wastewater through septic systems, which can be
significant pollution sources but also provide recharge, or through
consolidated wastewater-treatment systems, which often bypass aquifers and
release waters directly to surface waterways.75 Perhaps most importantly,
farmers deliberately introduce additional water to millions of acres of irrigated
land.76 Crops absorb some of this water, and some evaporates, but much of it
infiltrates beneath fields or through leaky irrigation ditches.77
In addition to altering the earth’s surface, humans also affect recharge by
manipulating air temperatures and the amount and timing of rain and snow. At
subglobal scales, people most often do this through large-scale landscape changes
like deforestation.78 Generally, removing forests reduces evapotranspiration,
which then reduces atmospheric moisture in downwind areas, which in turn
decreases precipitation and recharge in those same areas.79 Conversely, adding
irrigated areas can increase downwind precipitation and recharge.80 The extent

75. See, e.g., Millicent Lawton, Tapped Out, COMMONWEALTH MAG. (Dec. 1, 2000),

76.

77.

78.

79.

80.

https://perma.cc/7PG6-2UYT (describing how removing wastewater has depleted
local supplies in eastern Massachusetts). See generally S.S.D. Foster & P.J. Chilton,
Downstream of Downtown: Urban Wastewater as Groundwater Recharge, 12
HYDROGEOLOGY J. 115, 115 (2004) (noting that urban wastewater is both a major
pollution problem and an important resource).
See Guoyong Leng et al., A Modeling Study of Irrigation Effects on Global Surface Water
and Groundwater Resources Under a Changing Climate, 7 J. ADVANCES MODELING EARTH
SYS. 1285, 1285 (2015) (“[A]round 70% of global freshwater in 2000 was withdrawn for
irrigation, which accounted for 90% of consumptive water use.”).
Stephen Foster et al., Impact of Irrigated Agriculture on Groundwater-Recharge Salinity: A
Major Sustainability Concern in Semi-arid Regions, 26 HYDROGEOLOGY J. 2781, 2781
(2018) (“Where flood irrigation techniques with surface water are practiced on
permeable soils, they are a major source of groundwater recharge and often the
predominant one in arid terrains.”).
See generally R.A. Pielke Sr. et al., An Overview of Regional Land-Use and Land-Cover
Impacts on Rainfall, 59 TELLUS 587, 588-91, 593, 595 (2007) (describing a variety of
temperature effects in a variety of landscape types).
See Meine van Noordwijk et al., Climate-Forest-Water-People Relations: Seven System
Delineations, in FOREST AND WATER ON A CHANGING PLANET: VULNERABILITY,
ADAPTATION AND GOVERNANCE OPPORTUNITIES; A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT REPORT 27, 3537 (Irena F. Creed & Meine van Noordwijk eds., 2018).
See Ahmed M. Degu & Faisal Hossain, Investigating the Mesoscale Impact of Artificial
Reservoirs on Frequency of Rain During Growing Season, WATER RES. RSCH., May 5, 2012,
at 1, 11-14 (finding evidence of increased atmospheric moisture downwind of dams,
though primarily in Mediterranean climates); Anthony DeAngelis et al., Evidence of
Enhanced Precipitation Due to Irrigation over the Great Plains of the United States, J.
GEOPHYSICAL RSCH., Aug. 14, 2010, at 1, 2, 12 (summarizing prior research and finding
evidence consistent with increased precipitation downwind of areas irrigated from the
Ogallala Aquifer).
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of these effects varies substantially, however, with factors like temperature and
wind speed playing significant roles.81
An even more significant influence comes from anthropogenic climate
change.82 Climate change is warming the world, and that warming changes
evapotranspiration levels, shrinks glaciers and winter snowpacks, and
generates more intense storms and more frequent droughts.83 These changes
are making groundwater an increasingly appealing resource and thus are
raising the importance of groundwater recharge.84 But at the same time, these
changes will affect the amount of recharge that occurs and the places where it
happens, not always in consistent or predictable ways.85 In some locations,
reduced precipitation and warming-driven increases in evapotranspiration
will combine to decrease recharge, sometimes dramatically.86 Some locations
are likely to see increases in precipitation, which may bring associated
recharge increases.87 And in some areas, a wide range of outcomes is possible.88

81. See van Noordwijk et al., supra note 79, at 36 (describing pronounced effects in tropical

areas with low wind speeds).
82. Because deforestation is a major driver of climate change, and because climate change

83.
84.
85.

86.

87.
88.

threatens the viability of some forests, subglobal and global climate-related changes to
recharge are interrelated. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 45 fig.1.5 (2015), https://perma.cc/J69G38W4 (showing the relative influence of forestry and other land-use changes and of
fossil-fuel combustion); John T. Abatzoglou & A. Park Williams, Impact of
Anthropogenic Climate Change on Wildfire Across Western US Forests, 113 PNAS 11770,
11772 (2016) (estimating the “near doubling of forested burned area” attributable to
anthropogenic climate change). See generally Wen-Ying Wu et al., Divergent Effects of
Climate Change on Future Groundwater Availability in Key Mid-latitude Aquifers, NATURE
COMMC’NS, July 24, 2020, at 1, 1-2 (explaining why different aquifers will be subject to
different effects).
See Jiménez Cisneros & Oki, supra note 9, at 235-36.
See Green et al., supra note 13, at 539-40.
See Tashie et al., supra note 53, at 21 (“[T]he influence of these [climate-]altered
precipitation characteristics on groundwater recharge is complex and remains poorly
understood.”).
See Thomas Meixner et al., Implications of Projected Climate Change for Groundwater
Recharge in the Western United States, 534 J. HYDROLOGY 124, 132-35 (2016) (describing
projected recharge decreases in several aquifers); Bjørn Kløve et al., Climate Change
Impacts on Groundwater and Dependent Ecosystems, 518 J. HYDROLOGY 250, 250 (2014)
(“The predicted climate change will exacerbate these concerns in many parts of the
world by reducing precipitation and increasing evapotranspiration, both of which will
reduce recharge . . . .”).
See Meixner et al., supra note 86, at 135 (“[T]he wet areas will get wetter and the dry
areas will get drier.”).
See Gene‐Hua Crystal Ng et al., Probabilistic Analysis of the Effects of Climate Change on
Groundwater Recharge, WATER RES. RSCH., July 2010, at 1, 16-17 (describing a range of
scenarios for the High Plains).
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C. Regulatory Challenges
In summary, human activity pervasively affects groundwater recharge,
and recharge is crucially important to people in many ways. Accordingly, one
key point of this Article is that laws should address these interactions between
groundwater recharge and human decisions. But the complex realities of
groundwater management create three recurring challenges for any system of
groundwater law. This Part closes by explaining those difficulties.
Importantly, none of these challenges are unique to groundwater-recharge
regulation; informational deficits, policy tradeoffs, and cumulative effects are
the classic challenges of environmental and natural-resource law, and these
issues arise in many other regulatory fields.89 But each challenge arises with
particular force in this realm.
First, complexities, data gaps, and uncertainties abound. Even at aggregate
levels, the effects of recharge-altering practices can be difficult to measure. For
example, while general relationships between urbanization and water cycles
are well documented, scientists are still trying to understand many aspects of
the movement of water through urban areas.90 Additionally, developing a
conceptual and aggregate understanding is quite different from understanding
recharge effects at a parcel-by-parcel level—which might be important if law is
to assign responsibilities or accord benefits to individual landowners.
Similarly, effects of forest and fire management on recharge can be
complicated and variable over time. Further complicating matters, offsetting
effects often occur together. For example, in urban landscapes, imported water
and reductions in vegetation can increase recharge, while impervious surfaces
decrease recharge.91 Sorting out the net effect of these changes can be difficult
(and that net effect can vary from place to place).
Second, tradeoffs are pervasive. As may be obvious from the examples cited
so far, desirable groundwater recharge sometimes derives from otherwise
89. See, e.g., Owen, supra note 35, at 143-44 (describing the pervasiveness of cumulative-

effects problems); Holly Doremus, Data Gaps in Natural Resource Management: Sniffing
for Leaks Along the Information Pipeline, 83 IND. L.J. 407, 408 (2008) (describing
informational challenges); Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of
Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE
L.J. 1619, 1720-26 (2004); Sunstein, supra note 36, at 1653-54 (describing examples of
tradeoffs); William E. Odum, Environmental Degradation and the Tyranny of Small
Decisions, 32 BIOSCIENCE 728, 728 (1982) (describing the challenges of responding to
problems caused by incremental harms).
90. See Brian Miles & Lawrence E. Band, Green Infrastructure Stormwater Management at the
Watershed Scale: Urban Variable Source Area and Watershed Capacitance, 29
HYDROLOGICAL PROCESSES 2268, 2269-70 (2015) (explaining the complexities and
uncertainties of urban stormwater flow).
91. See Sharp, supra note 65, at 52-54 (noting the influence of vegetation changes and
describing leaks as a source of groundwater recharge).
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problematic practices. In both urban and agricultural landscapes, groundwater
recharge is often a byproduct of inefficient or even sloppy water use.92
Consequently, while people tend to praise efficient water use, efficiency
improvements can have negative collateral consequences for groundwater
recharge.93 Similarly, if a goal is to maximize groundwater recharge (and, more
generally, water outflows of any kind) from forested landscapes, the simplest
measure might be to eliminate the forest, which could increase flooding,
decrease water quality, and undercut many of the other benefits brought by
forested landscapes.94 Not every recharge-management measure will present
difficult tradeoffs; there are also important synergies between increasing
groundwater storage and other policy goals. Recharging urban stormwater, for
example, is generally good for water storage and for surface-water quality
(though it can also flood basements),95 and allowing rivers back into their
floodplains can benefit aquatic species and reduce flooding risks further
downstream, as well as enhancing groundwater storage.96 But in many
circumstances, efforts to maximize groundwater recharge can create tensions
with other important policy goals.
Third, groundwater-recharge challenges often arise from the collective
effects of many individual actions.97 In an urban area, for example, thousands
of property owners are likely responsible for the roofs and paved areas that
limit recharge—and for the leaky pipes that might partially offset the effects of
those impervious surfaces. Even in rural areas, where parcels tend to be bigger,
many landowners may share an aquifer’s recharge area. This diffusion of
ownership, and therefore of potential responsibility, does not always exist; in
the American West, for example, a single entity—the U.S. Forest Service—
92. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
93. See, e.g., Matt Weiser, Drip Irrigation: Not the Drought-Buster You Thought, NEW

94.

95.
96.

97.

HUMANITARIAN: WATER DEEPLY (Sept. 25, 2015), https://perma.cc/A6FX-TV9E (“Some
critics of drip irrigation have another complaint: It eliminates groundwater recharge, a
side benefit of the water wasted in flood irrigation.”); Consejo de Desarrollo Economico
de Mexicali, A.C. v. United States, 482 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9th Cir. 2007) (describing
Mexico’s reliance on an aquifer recharged by seepage from southern California’s AllAmerican Canal).
See, e.g., Scanlon et al., supra note 38, at 3350 (describing recharge-rate increases “up to
about 2 orders of magnitude” associated with deforestation in Australia); van
Noordwijk et al., supra note 79, at 45 (explaining ways in which intact forests support
water quality).
See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., FLOOD-MAR: USING FLOOD WATER FOR MANAGED
AQUIFER RECHARGE TO SUPPORT SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES 24, 26 (2018),
https://perma.cc/S6TD-4SJF.
This challenge is not unique to groundwater. For a general discussion of the
importance of cumulative-impact challenges, see Owen, supra note 35, at 143-44.
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manages the land where most precipitation occurs.98 But in many places, the
large number of landowners involved can make it quite difficult for individual
landowners to understand or even notice their contributions to larger
problems or solutions, and collective-action challenges can inhibit any attempt
at solutions.99
These complexities partly explain why groundwater-recharge law is not
well developed, and they might also seem like good reasons to avoid its
development. Indeed, as Part III explains in more detail, a threshold question
about groundwater-recharge laws should be whether, for the particular place
they are proposed, they will be more trouble than they are worth. But many
places will not meet that description. In the United States alone, many areas
already face severe groundwater-management challenges. A partial list might
include California’s San Joaquin Valley; the Ogallala Aquifer, which extends
from New Mexico and Texas to South Dakota; the Atlantic coastal plain; much
of the Colorado River watershed; and even the seemingly well-watered lower
Mississippi River Valley.100 In all of these places, water tables have plunged by
dozens or even hundreds of feet, and groundwater depletion is so enormous
that it is best measured in cubic kilometers.101 Unfortunately, these places are
not outliers. In a world with a growing human population and an increasingly
unstable climate, the need for groundwater-recharge management and an
associated body of law will often be unavoidable, even if developing those legal
regimes will be difficult.
II. The Past and Present Law of Groundwater Recharge
So how has the law addressed these challenges? In the United States, for the
most part, it hasn’t, or at least hasn’t done so pursuant to any conscious
design.102 Groundwater-recharge law does exist. But other than laws that
98. See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., PNW-GTR-812, WATER, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND

99.

100.

101.
102.

FORESTS: WATERSHED STEWARDSHIP FOR A CHANGING CLIMATE 6 (2010),
https://perma.cc/6ZJQ-CWYZ (“National forests alone provide . . . over half the water
in the West.”).
See, e.g., Wells, CAL. DEP’T WATER RES., https://perma.cc/ZY3W-TGB2 (archived
Mar. 11, 2021) (estimating that “[a]s many as two million wells tap California’s
groundwater”). On collective-action challenges with groundwater (and other
resources), see Thompson, supra note 18, at 249-53, 258-65.
See generally LEONARD F. KONIKOW, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURV., SCIENCE INVESTIGATIONS REP. 2013-5079, GROUNDWATER DEPLETION IN THE
UNITED STATES (1900-2008) (2013), https://perma.cc/8ZHB-QCH5 (providing an
overview of areas with severe groundwater depletion).
Id. at 4-7, 23-24.
My research assistants and I searched the statutes and regulations of every state for
references to groundwater recharge. That search provides the primary basis for my
claims about missing elements of groundwater-recharge law. For each state, my
footnote continued on next page
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protect groundwater from polluted recharge103 or address deliberate recharge
of imported surface water,104 groundwater-recharge law arises primarily as an
incidental consequence of the pursuit of other priorities. Its coverage is also
quite limited.
This Part surveys the law of groundwater recharge.105 It focuses first on
laws governing development of the land surface; then on laws affecting
floodplains; then on laws governing vegetation management, primarily in
forests and agricultural fields; and then, finally and more briefly, on the
growing field of managed aquifer recharge.106

103.

104.

105.

106.

research assistants and I searched Westlaw’s databases of statutory text, regulatory
text, and case law. We began searches using the search terms “groundwater recharg!”
and “groundwater regulation.” Because these search terms were both over- and
underinclusive, we also used links and tables of contents to navigate from the code
sections produced by our searches to other code sections. Finally, we supplemented the
Westlaw searches with Google searches (using similar search terms), which we used to
find agency websites and secondary-source coverage and to locate (or confirm the
absence of) relevant code sections that our terms-based searches had missed.
See supra note 32 (discussing federal laws protecting groundwater from contamination);
see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 12-2-8 (2020) (providing authority for a regulatory program to
protect recharge areas from potentially contaminating land uses); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 58:11A-13 (West 2021) (requiring recharge-area mapping and publication of model
ordinances designed to limit groundwater-contamination threats); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 485-C:1(II) (2021) (“The legislature finds that the most effective means of
preserving the existing high quality of groundwater is by identification and careful
management of operations or activities which may cause contamination of
groundwater if not properly conducted.”).
These laws exist primarily in western states. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-811.01
(2021) (governing underground facility storage permits); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.135(1)
(2019) (defining groundwater recharge as a beneficial use of surface water); IDAHO CODE
§ 42-4202 (2021) (governing the formation of aquifer-recharge districts, which oversee
artificial-recharge projects).
This summary omits laws with more attenuated connections to groundwater recharge.
In a sense, any law that affects human development or land-use patterns has
implications for groundwater, at least if one follows the causal chains far enough. See,
e.g., Dave Owen, Water and Taxes, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1559, 1572-85 (2017) (describing
water-use incentives created by tax provisions). But to keep the scope of coverage
manageable, the discussion here is more focused.
Because of its relatively small footprint upon the landscape, mining is not discussed.
But many of the references to groundwater recharge in state law come from provisions
requiring restoration of recharge after surface mining of coal is complete. See, e.g., 312
IND. ADMIN. CODE 25-6-22(a) (2021) (requiring restoration of recharge capacity); MD.
CODE REGS. 26.20.20.02 (2021) (same). Those provisions in turn derive from the federal
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977. See Pub. L. No. 95-87,
§ 515(b)(10)(D), 91 Stat. 445, 489 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(10)(D))
(requiring state or federal permits to include provisions requiring the permittee to
“restor[e] recharge capacity of the mined area to approximate premining conditions”).
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A. Developing Land
One of the most common ways humans affect recharge is by developing
land. A robust legal regime for managing groundwater recharge therefore
would address these impacts. Existing law is far from that ideal, however. Old
common law doctrines, including the “common enemy rule,” allow
landowners to ignore changes to groundwater recharge.107 In contrast, some
newer legal requirements more directly address recharge, either by limiting
the ability of development to create additional surface-water runoff or by
protecting streams and wetlands—which often function as recharge zones—
from being filled.108 But the doctrines addressing development affect only
small portions of the American landscape, and the scope of stream and wetland
protections is currently under attack.
1.

The common enemy

The oldest legal doctrine that directly (though not explicitly) addresses
groundwater recharge is a property and tort rule known as the commonenemy doctrine.109 On its face, the doctrine addresses the management of
surface-water runoff before that surface water reaches a permanent
watercourse or percolates into the ground.110 It addresses, in other words,
overland drainage of rain and snowmelt.111 The core doctrine establishes that a
landowner may do with that runoff as she will, even if that means redirecting
it onto the property of downstream or downhill landowners.112 The origins of
the rule are obscure, but courts and scholars generally trace its roots to
nineteenth-century preferences for economic development and even older
British distaste for swamps.113 The underlying ideas were that surface water
was an inconvenience that each landowner was entitled to battle and that
107. See ANTHONY DAN TARLOCK & JASON ANTHONY ROBISON, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND

RESOURCES § 3:12 (West 2020).
108. See infra Parts II.A.2-.3.
109. See, e.g., Garbarino v. Van Cleave, 330 P.2d 28, 31 (Or. 1958) (“[N]o one has the right to

110.
111.
112.

113.

complain that the volume of water in its natural channels is increased by the artificial
drainage of lands which naturally drain therein.” (quoting TOM W. SMURR, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF FARM DRAINAGE FOUNDED ON THE LAWS AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS § 3, at 5-6 (1909))).
See TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 107, § 3.12.
Id.
See, e.g., Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor R.R. Co., 67 Me. 353, 356 (1877) (“He may erect
structures upon his own land as high as he pleases without regard to its effect upon
surface water, no matter how much others are disturbed by it.”).
See Jill M. Fraley, Water, Water, Everywhere: Surface Water Liability, 5 MICH. J. ENV’T &
ADMIN. L. 73, 79, 93-94 (2015) (describing the origins and evolution of the commonenemy rule).

1183

Law, Land Use, and Groundwater Recharge
73 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (2021)

maintaining a natural water cycle should not get in the way of economic
exploitation of land.114
As usually stated, the common-enemy rule doesn’t mention groundwater
recharge, and cases involving the rule rarely discuss groundwater.115 But the
rule clearly is part of groundwater-recharge law. The rule exists because
development of land (and conversion of wetlands to agricultural use) often
generates additional surface runoff. At least some of that additional surface
runoff occurs because water that previously infiltrated into the ground, and
thus recharged groundwater, is rerouted over the ground surface. The rule, in
other words, is about dealing with the prevention of recharge. And its core
tenet—that landowners have no obligation to address the consequences of
recharge prevention—generates no incentive to worry about recharge loss.
The traditional common-enemy rule no longer predominates in American
common law.116 In states that still endorse the rule, qualifications abound, and
other jurisdictions instead apply a rule of reasonableness to increased runoff
associated with development patterns.117 But these alternative rules also are
designed to accommodate some increase in runoff and, though they do not
acknowledge it, concomitant decreases in groundwater recharge.118 The
common law of surface runoff, in short, assigns groundwater recharge no
value.
2.

Urbanization

With groundwater recharge, as with most areas of law, the era of common
law primacy has largely passed, and many modern statutes and regulatory
schemes address ways in which development decreases stormwater runoff and
increases surface flow. That body of law comes partly from the federal
government but primarily from state and local governments, which have
broad authority over development through their powers to zone land and set

114. See id.
115. For two cases involving the common-enemy rule that do mention groundwater, see B

& B, LLC v. Lake Erie Land Co., 943 N.E.2d 917, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); and Scalesse v.
Davis, No. 36610-0-II, 2009 WL 342972, at *1, *4, *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 12, 2009).
Neither case focuses on groundwater recharge.
116. See TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 107, § 3.12.
117. Id.; see also Fraley, supra note 113, at 95-96 (describing exceptions to the commonenemy rule).
118. See TARLOCK & ROBISON, supra note 107, § 3.12 (“Most states follow a reasonable use rule
that gives a property owner a qualified privilege to improve his property, alter
drainage patterns, and tap into adjoining drains without the permission of the
landowner.”).
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building codes.119 In some places, these federal, state, and local laws promote
groundwater recharge, though generally with the goal of limiting flooding
rather than maintaining water supplies.120 But the geographic coverage of
recharge-promoting laws remains limited.121
Some groundwater-recharge law comes from laws focused primarily on
stormwater management. The federal Clean Water Act requires midsized and
larger municipalities to obtain (typically from state regulators) stormwaterdischarge permits,122 and those permits are supposed to include programs for
managing postconstruction stormwater runoff—which, in lay terms, means
managing water that the newly built impervious surfaces prevent from
infiltrating into the ground.123 Independent of Clean Water Act permitting
requirements, some states and municipalities require new or retrofitted
construction projects to be designed to infiltrate most stormwater on site, at
least so long as storms remain below designated thresholds.124 More
ambitiously, some municipalities have created stormwater utilities, which
charge property owners fees based on the amount of impervious area on their
properties.125 Municipal stormwater managers then use the resulting revenue
for stormwater-management projects, some of which may involve
constructing “green infrastructure” for infiltration.126 Because of these
119. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, VICKI BEEN, RODERICK M. HILLS, JR. & CHRISTOPHER SERKIN,

120.

121.
122.
123.
124.

125.

126.

LAND USE CONTROLS: CASES AND MATERIALS 45 (4th ed. 2013) (“Public land use
regulation in the United States traditionally has been mainly the province of local
governments.”).
A notable exception is Delaware, which makes recharge protection a central goal of its
laws governing development and impervious cover. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6082(b)
(2021).
See infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(p).
40 C.F.R. § 122.34(b)(5) (2020); see also Env’t Def. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 846
(9th Cir. 2003).
See, e.g., SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CAL., CODE OF REGUL. ORDINANCES § 67.811(b) (2021)
(providing stormwater-infiltration requirements for “Priority Development Projects”).
See generally STORMWATER PERMIT MANUAL § 890 (West Supp. 2011) (summarizing
state programs).
See U.S. EPA NEW ENGLAND, EPA 901-F-09-004, FUNDING STORMWATER PROGRAMS 1
(2009), https://perma.cc/4FKR-B9ZS (“More than 800 communities or districts across
the country have adopted a stormwater utility . . . .”). See generally Avi Brisman, Considerations
in Establishing a Stormwater Utility, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 505 (2002) (describing the operation
of stormwater utilities).
See NAT’L ESTUARY PROGRAM, U.S. EPA, EPA 842-R-14-005, GETTING TO GREEN: PAYING
FOR GREEN INFRASTRUCTURE; FINANCING OPTIONS AND RESOURCES FOR LOCAL
DECISION-MAKERS 1-2, 6-7 (2014), https://perma.cc/CQ8J-954Z; Erin Adele Scharff,
Green Fees: The Challenge of Pricing Externalities Under State Law, 97 NEB. L. REV. 168,
205-06 (2018).
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requirements, there are some places in the United States where urbanization’s
impacts on groundwater recharge are highly regulated.127
Nevertheless, those places encompass a tiny percentage of the American
landscape. Under the Clean Water Act, municipal stormwater permits only
cover relatively densely populated areas, which means that many suburban
and rural areas fall outside their coverage.128 Many state and local stormwaterpermitting programs cover only new development or redevelopment; existing
impervious areas are often grandfathered.129 Additionally, even highly
developed urban areas with low population density—for example, shopping
malls—may be uncovered.130 Small projects also are routinely exempted from
requirements for runoff control.131 And outside of already-urbanized areas,
few states and cities have robust stormwater-management programs.132 The
compliance costs associated with these programs can be substantial—
particularly if they cover existing development—which makes them
controversial.133 Consequently, they have tended to emerge in places—the
127. See Owen, supra note 63, at 454-55.
128. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(D) (requiring permits only for municipal storm-sewer systems

that serve over 100,000 people).
129. See, e.g., 1 MASS. DEP’T OF ENV’T PROT., MASSACHUSETTS STORMWATER HANDBOOK 1-2

(2008), https://perma.cc/VGL4-VZRB (to download, click “View the live page” and
then click “Massachusetts Stormwater Handbook Vol. 1 Ch. 1, Stormwater
Management Standards”). The handbook states:
Loss of annual recharge to groundwater shall be eliminated or minimized through the use of
infiltration measures including environmentally sensitive site design, low impact
development techniques, stormwater best management practices, and good operation and
maintenance. At a minimum, the annual recharge from the post-development site shall
approximate the annual recharge from pre-development conditions based on soil type.

Id. at 1. That requirement applies to new but not existing development. Id. at 2.
130. See Dave Owen et al., Collaboration, Clean Water Act Residual Designation Authority, and

Collective Permitting: A Case Study of Long Creek, WATERSHED SCI. BULL., Fall 2010, at 25,
27 (describing a mall-dominated watershed in Maine).
131. See WATER PERMITS DIV., U.S. EPA, SUMMARY OF STATE POST CONSTRUCTION
STORMWATER STANDARDS 3 tbl.1 (rev. 2016), https://perma.cc/53BQ-NZ6S
(summarizing state standards for postconstruction runoff, most of which exempt
projects that disturb less than an acre).
132. See id. at 1, 3 tbl.1 (summarizing coverage and finding that many states have no
stormwater-control requirements outside MS4 areas, which are “sites in regulated
Phase I and Phase II Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System areas”); see also Allison H.
Roy et al., Impediments and Solutions to Sustainable, Watershed-Scale Urban Stormwater
Management: Lessons from Australia and the United States, 42 ENV’T MGMT. 344, 349 (2008)
(noting that despite some local governments employing “[c]omprehensive stormwater
ordinances,” there is “considerable variability in requirements within ordinances and
[the] presence of such requirements nationwide”).
133. See Janet E. Milne, Storms Ahead: Climate Change Adaptation Calls for Resilient Funding,
39 VT. L. REV. 819, 862 (2015) (describing the political vulnerability of stormwater fees);
Owen, supra note 63, at 486-88.
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Chesapeake Bay134 or Lake Tahoe135 watersheds, for example—where a
stressed and highly visible water resource inspires willingness to undertake
ambitious regulatory programs, or in places where urban flooding problems
lead municipal officials to think that green infrastructure might be cheaper
than any alternative.136 In most places, regulation of development’s impacts on
recharge remains minimal. And because the programs that do exist tend to be
motivated by problems with flooding and surface-water pollution, not
groundwater shortages, they are absent in many places where flooding and
surface-water quality are less concerning but groundwater shortages are
potentially severe.137 In summary, groundwater-recharge protection is often
an incidental consequence of a spotty and incomplete system of urban
stormwater regulation.
In a few states, hints of an alternative system, in which maintaining
groundwater recharge is a goal rather than an incidental consequence of landuse development, do exist. Several states require mapping of areas with high
recharge potential, though generally for the purpose of facilitating pollutionprevention measures.138 Delaware, in contrast to most other states, has taken
its program a few steps further; it couples a statewide mapping program with a
requirement that local governments integrate recharge protection into their
systems for regulating development.139 But Delaware is an outlier. Even states

134. See Md. Dep’t of the Env’t v. Cnty. Comm’rs, 214 A.3d 61, 69-78 (Md. 2019) (describing

Chesapeake Bay protection and stormwater management in Maryland).
135. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306-11

136.

137.

138.

139.

(2002) (describing the impetus for regulating runoff in the Lake Tahoe watershed);
Water Quality & Stormwater Management, TAHOE REG’L PLAN. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/
N8UL-CK3D (archived Mar. 11, 2021).
See, e.g., Bruce Stutz, With a Green Makeover, Philadelphia Is Tackling Its Stormwater
Problem, YALE ENV’T 360 (Mar. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/VSC8-4ZVK (describing
Philadelphia’s green-infrastructure program).
See WATER PERMITS DIV., U.S. EPA, supra note 131, at 3 tbl.1 (summarizing state
requirements, showing that many arid states have only minimal requirements and
impose those requirements only in MS4 areas).
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:11A-13 (West 2021) (“The Department of Environmental
Protection . . . shall prepare and publish a methodology which shall allow the user to
define, rank and map aquifer recharge areas.”); GA. COMP. R. & REGS. 391-3-16.02 (2021)
(describing recharge-area mapping); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-354c (2021) (requiring
mapping of recharge areas for stratified-drift aquifers).
See Delaware GroundWater Recharge Potential, DEL. FIRSTMAP DATA, https://perma.cc/
WN8P-VLV3 (archived Mar. 11, 2021) (to interact with map, click “View the live
page”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6082(b) (2021) (requiring counties and municipalities to
provide special planning for areas with “excellent ground-water recharge potential”).
For an example of a local ordinance implementing these requirements, see Blades, Del.,
Wellhead and Excellent Groundwater Recharge Area Protection Ordinance (June 8,
2009).
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that otherwise have highly sophisticated systems of water law do little to
directly address the impacts of development on groundwater recharge.140
3.

Stream and wetland fills

Beyond addressing the general impacts of urbanization (and of other land
uses), a comprehensive legal system for groundwater-recharge management
would protect ephemeral streams and wetlands. Often—particularly in arid
landscapes—those ephemeral water features are important sites for recharge
because only in areas where water is concentrated can it penetrate otherwise
moisture-starved soils and percolate down to the water table.141 In wetter
landscapes, those streams and wetlands can play a somewhat different role,
often by managing the timing of recharge and reducing fluctuations in stream
levels—which means, in practical terms, putting more water into groundwater
storage and less into floods.142 Some laws have traditionally protected those
features, but they are under attack.
In the United States, the primary protection of ephemeral streams and
wetlands has come from the Clean Water Act.143 Section 301 of the Act
prohibits the unpermitted discharge of pollutants into “navigable waters,”144
which the statute defines as “waters of the United States.”145 Section 404
permits discharges of dredged or fill material at “specified disposal sites” and
thus creates an exception to section 301, but only if the discharging entity
obtains a permit from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.146 The Army Corps
issues tens of thousands of these permits every year,147 but they come with
strings attached; generally, permit recipients must avoid impacting streams or
140. Water lawyers widely view Colorado, for example, as having one of the most

141.

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

sophisticated water-management systems in the country. But the Colorado statutory
and administrative provisions pertaining to groundwater recharge are generally
directed at managed recharge of surface water. E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(9)(d)
(2021) (establishing that the extraction of artificially recharged water is a beneficial
use); COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1 (2021) (establishing permitting rules for artificially
recharged groundwater).
See M.O. Cuthbert et al., Understanding and Quantifying Focused, Indirect Groundwater
Recharge from Ephemeral Streams Using Water Table Fluctuations, 52 WATER RES. RSCH.
827, 827 (2016) (“Groundwater recharge in drylands predominantly occurs via leakage
from ephemeral streams.”).
See McCauley et al., supra note 72, at 10 (asserting that losses of wetlands reduce
groundwater storage and increase flooding).
Clean Water Act, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251-1388).
33 U.S.C. § 1311.
Id. § 1362(7).
Id. § 1344.
See RYAN W. TAYLOR, FEDERALISM OF WETLANDS 88 (2013) (providing statistics).
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wetlands if they can, minimize the unavoidable impacts they do create, and
compensate for impacts that remain.148 Neither these specific provisions nor
the Clean Water Act more generally focuses on groundwater; Congress’s
central concern was with surface-water quality.149 But an incidental
consequence of protecting stream and wetland areas is to protect zones where
recharge often occurs.150
These incidental protections have been evolving for decades.151 For many
years, the trend was toward greater protection of temporary waterways.152
The Army Corps was initially reluctant to require permitting for small
wetlands and streams, and while it acknowledged its regulatory jurisdiction
over them, it generally let people fill them at will.153 But over the course of
several decades, extending through the Obama Administration, the Army
Corps began requiring permitting for more small wetlands and more
intermittent and even ephemeral streams, effectively increasing the scope of
regulatory protections for many areas where concentrated recharge occurs.154
More recently, however, a countervailing trend has predominated. The
shift has its roots in Supreme Court decisions. In 2001, in Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Supreme Court held
that isolated wetlands were not “waters of the United States” within the
meaning of the Clean Water Act.155 And in 2006, in Rapanos v. United
States,156 a fractured Court established multiple tests for the scope of federal
Clean Water Act jurisdiction. One of those tests, which Justice Scalia
articulated in a plurality opinion, would have eliminated Clean Water Act
protection for most temporary streams and wetlands.157 The Rapanos decision
148. Permit Program Under CWA Section 404: Overview, U.S. EPA, https://perma.cc/2NLG-

PW3J (last updated June 17, 2020).
149. See Kaela Shiigi, Note, Underground Pathways to Pollution: The Need for Better Guidance on

150.

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Groundwater Hydrologically Connected to Surface Water, 46 ECOLOGY L.Q. 519, 524, 527
(2019) (noting that “the CWA does not mention hydrologically connected
groundwater” and describing the legislative history behind this selective focus).
See WINTER ET AL., supra note 11, at 9-10 (describing how “losing streams”—those that
“lose water to ground water by outflow through the streambed”—can recharge
aquifers).
See generally Dave Owen, Little Streams and Legal Transformations, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 1
(describing changes in the law of stream protection).
See id. at 15-31.
Id. at 20-22.
See id. at 29-31.
531 U.S. 159, 162-63 (2001).
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
See id. at 732 (plurality opinion) (“On this definition, ‘the waters of the United States’
include only relatively permanent, standing or flowing bodies of water.”).
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initially had a modest impact because the Army Corps and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) generally followed a “significant nexus” test
articulated by Justice Kennedy,158 and the agencies often concluded that
intermittent and ephemeral water features met this test.159 And in 2015, the
agencies finalized regulations that would have codified those broad
protections.160 But the Trump Administration launched a frontal assault on
the 2015 regulations and on Clean Water Act jurisdiction more generally.161 Its
new regulations, finalized in 2020, eliminated all Clean Water Act protections
for ephemeral streams and ephemeral (and some non-ephemeral) wetlands.162
This change does not necessarily mean that recharge zones can now be
filled at will. The Clean Water Act reserves states’ abilities to establish more
stringent protections,163 and states also have broad power to regulate land use,

158. See id. at 780, 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Kennedy explained

159.

160.
161.

162.

163.

that “wetlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the statutory phrase
‘navigable waters,’ if the wetlands, either alone or in combination with similarly
situated lands in the region, significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as ‘navigable.’ ” Id. at 780.
See J.B. Ruhl, Proving the Rapanos Significant Nexus, NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Summer 2018, at
51, 52 (“All circuit courts that have ruled on the matter have concluded that an area
meeting Justice Kennedy’s significant nexus test is within CWA jurisdiction, although
some circuit courts have decided that jurisdiction applies if the area meets either the
significant nexus test or the plurality’s ‘relatively permanent’ test.”); Owen, supra
note 151, at 29-31 (describing regulatory protections for ephemeral streams).
Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054
(June 29, 2015) (repealed 2019).
See Definition of ‘‘Waters of the United States’’—Recodification of Pre-Existing Rules,
84 Fed. Reg. 56,626 (Oct. 22, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts
of 40 C.F.R.) (repealing the 2015 rule); Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Rulemaking
Process, U.S. EPA, https://perma.cc/3DCA-XDC4 (last updated Aug. 27, 2020); John
Flesher, Trump Administration Drops Obama-Era Water Protection Rule, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Sept. 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/U48U-PY4L.
The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of ‘‘Waters of the United States,’’ 85
Fed. Reg. 22,250, 22,251 (Apr. 21, 2020) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and scattered parts
of 40 C.F.R.). The Biden Administration has stated its interest in revisiting the 2020
regulations, and the EPA and Army Corps have requested stays in litigation
challenging those regulations. See Jeremy P. Jacobs & Pamela King, Biden Races
Courts for Chance to Torpedo Trump Water Rule, GREENWIRE (Apr. 28, 2021),
https://perma.cc/3K64-5YVP (describing the evolving status of the litigation). But as
this Article goes to press, neither the White House nor the EPA or Army Corps has
stated specific plans for future rules, and the 2020 regulations remain in effect. Id.
See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 723 (1994)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (“Not a single sentence, phrase, or word in the Clean Water
Act purports to place any constraint on a State’s power to regulate the quality of its
own waters more stringently than federal law might require.”).
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so states could step in to fill the emerging federal voids.164 But in many areas,
that void is unlikely to be filled. Many states have opted to just rely on federal
law for stream and wetland protection.165 Some even have laws specifically
forbidding state agencies from adopting any protections that go beyond federal
law.166 And that federal protection now has an uncertain future.
The impacts of these regulatory changes upon recharge also are likely to
be complex, and they may vary from watershed to watershed. One possibility
is that filling more streams or wetlands means a reduction in the area where
recharge occurs, which in turn means less recharge and more surface flow.
Studies from the Northern Plains suggest that this outcome will sometimes
occur.167 But in other landscapes, different results are possible. Filling a stream
or wetland does not eliminate the precipitation that once created that stream
or wetland; it still must go somewhere, and its new flow path may offer greater
or lesser possibilities for infiltration. Indeed, because wetlands and stream
channels often concentrate vegetation as well as water, moving that water
elsewhere in the landscape might reduce transpiration levels, which could
sometimes lead to greater amounts of recharge.168 The scientific literature on
these questions is very limited—many studies note that streams and wetlands
are important sites for recharge,169 but few discuss how overall recharge levels
would change if those streams or wetlands were lost. Thus, the reductions in
stream and wetland protections may best be viewed as, among many other
things, an uncontrolled experiment in groundwater-recharge manipulation.
B. Managing Floods
For some of the same reasons that temporary streams and wetlands can be
important to groundwater recharge, floodplains also are important.
Floodplains are zones where floodwaters spill beyond permanent surfacewater features and inundate the landscape. Some of that water evaporates and
164. California is the most prominent state to have done so. See Bettina Boxall, California

165.

166.

167.
168.
169.

Adopts New Wetlands Rules to Protect Them from Trump Rollbacks, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 2,
2019, 4:15 PM), https://perma.cc/XL4Y-9A6B.
See Phillip Bower & Megan McLean, The Proposed WOTUS Rule: How Do States Regulate
Nonfederal Wetlands?, TRENDS (Am. Bar Ass’n Section Env’t, Energy & Res., Chi., Ill.),
Mar./Apr. 2019, at 6, 6-8 (noting that many states rely on Clean Water Act section 401
for wetlands authority).
See Andrew Hecht, Note, Obstacles to the Devolution of Environmental Protection: States’
Self-Imposed Limitations on Rulemaking, 15 DUKE ENV’T. L. & POL’Y F. 105, 115-16, 116
n.42 (2004).
See McCauley et al., supra note 72, at 10.
See van der Kamp & Hayashi, supra note 72, at 49 (explaining that in prairie wetlands,
most recharged groundwater supports the vegetation surrounding the wetland).
See, e.g., OFF. OF RSCH. & DEV., U.S. EPA, supra note 73, at 1-8.
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some of it eventually flows back into the river or stream from which it came.
But in many floodplain areas, some floodwaters infiltrate into the ground,
where they may be available for pumping or may gradually flow back through
the ground and then into surface waterways.170 Flood-zone recharge therefore
can supply multiple important benefits: It can dissipate the flood, and it also
stores water that can replenish surface flows in drier periods (or can be
pumped for other human uses).171
Well-designed groundwater-recharge laws therefore might seek to
preserve rivers’ connections with their floodplains. They might do this in
several ways. Local governments, which typically hold authority to zone land,
might limit floodplain development and select undeveloped land uses that can
accommodate some flooding.172 State and federal river-management agencies,
like the Army Corps or the Bureau of Reclamation, might manage dams to
promote periodic flooding and might try to direct river flows into areas where
groundwater recharge will occur.173 And where flood-control infrastructure
already exists, its governmental managers might seek to selectively dismantle
it, ideally allowing floods to expand into areas with strong recharge potential
(and with landowners who will agree, perhaps for a price, to allow flooding of
their lands).174 More ambitiously, and also more intrusively, government
regulators might ask owners of flood-protected land to take some steps to
compensate for the recharge those lands no longer provide.
For most of our history, however, the United States’ policy has been to do
exactly the opposite. For decades, the Army Corps and other federal, state, and
local agencies have focused on keeping floodwaters out of floodplains.175 They
(and local governments and private entities) have built thousands of dams, often
170. See R. Doble et al., Modelling Overbank Flood Recharge at a Continental Scale, 18
171.
172.

173.

174.

175.

HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCIS. 1273, 1274 (2014).
See OFF. OF RSCH. & DEV., U.S. EPA, supra note 73, at 4-5 tbl.4-1.
See James M. Holway & Raymond J. Burby, Reducing Flood Losses: Local Planning and
Land Use Controls, 59 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 205, 212 (1993); JAMES M. WRIGHT, Strategies and
Tools to Maintain or Restore Floodplain Resources, in FLOODPLAIN MANAGEMENT:
PRINCIPLES AND CURRENT PRACTICES 9-1, 9-3 (2007), https://perma.cc/5K82-CD6M
(providing examples of floodplain-compatible land uses).
See, e.g., Robert M. Gailey et al., Maximizing On-Farm Groundwater Recharge with Surface
Reservoir Releases: A Planning Approach and Case Study in California, USA, 27
HYDROGEOLOGY J. 1183, 1185-86 (2019) (describing the possibility of using timed
releases from Folsom Reservoir).
See, e.g., RAMONA O. SWENSON ET AL., NATURE CONSERVANCY, RESTORING FLOODS TO
FLOODPLAINS: RIPARIAN AND FLOODPLAIN RESTORATION AT THE COSUMNES RIVER
PRESERVE 3-4 (2003), https://perma.cc/X28K-S3QC (describing the use of intentional
levee breaches for floodplain restoration).
See generally A. Dan Tarlock, United States Flood Control Policy: The Incomplete Transition
from the Illusion of Total Protection to Risk Management, 23 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 151
(2012) (describing the rise and partial fall of this policy).
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partly for the legislatively specified purpose of storing floodwaters and thus
eliminating downstream flooding.176 Governmental and nongovernmental
actors also have built thousands of miles of levees, again with the primary
purpose of isolating rivers from their floodplains.177 Development—often
facilitated by local zoning laws and federal flood insurance—often springs up
behind those levees, further limiting the option of allowing rivers beyond their
banks.178 Other land-management practices also disconnect rivers and streams
from floodplains. Both cattle grazing, which is common on western lands, and
urbanization can cause “downcutting” of streams, which means that streams
erode deep gullies that prevent even high flows from spilling onto the
surrounding land.179 The consequence is that many formerly significant
groundwater-recharge zones have been idled, with the idling directly caused by
physical infrastructure and more indirectly facilitated by federal legislation and
state and local land-use law. All of these flood-limiting practices tend to occur
with little or no discussion of—let alone legal response to—their impacts on
groundwater recharge. The upshot is that there are flood-prone regions—
Houston and Baton Rouge, for example—where people must worry
simultaneously about having too much water above the ground and not enough
below, and where the land subsidence associated with groundwater deficits
makes surface-water-flooding problems even worse.180
176. Id. at 160-65 (describing the emergence of flood-control dams); Dave Owen & Colin

177.

178.

179.

180.

Apse, Trading Dams, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1043, 1052-53 (2015) (summarizing statistics
on the number of dams in the United States).
See Kara Scheel et al., Understanding the Large-Scale Influence of Levees on Floodplain
Connectivity Using a Hydrogeomorphic Approach, 55 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 413, 414
(2019) (describing rivers disconnected from most of their floodplain, along with the
difficulties of calculating aggregate-scale impacts of levees); U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
Levees of the Nation, NAT’L LEVEE DATABASE, https://perma.cc/EP8V-Y7QN (archived
Mar. 11, 2021) (stating that, as of March 2021, the United States had 25,618 miles of
levees).
See Jessica Ludy & G. Matt Kondolf, Flood Risk Perception in Lands ‘‘Protected’’ by 100 -Year
Levees, 61 NAT. HAZARDS 829, 830-32 (2012) (observing that development often occurs
behind levees, facilitated by misperceptions of risk and by the National Flood
Insurance Program’s classification of levee-protected areas as non-floodplain);
Raymond J. Burby, Flood Insurance and Floodplain Management: The US Experience, 3
ENV’T HAZARDS 111, 111 (2001) (“[E]xtensive development has occurred in areas with
the greatest risk from flood hazards, and the rate of development, rather than
decreasing, has actually increased at unprecedented rates over the past 30 yr [sic].”).
See, e.g., Robert J. Hawley et al., Suburban Stream Erosion Rates in Northern Kentucky
Exceed Reference Channels by an Order of Magnitude and Follow Predictable Trajectories of
Channel Evolution, GEOMORPHOLOGY, Mar. 1, 2020, at 1, 6 fig.3, 10 figs.10 & 11 (showing
diagrams and photographs of downcutting suburban streams); A.J. Belsky et al., Survey
of Livestock Influences on Stream and Riparian Ecosystems in the Western United States, 54 J.
SOIL & WATER CONSERVATION 419, 427 (1999).
See, e.g., Bob Rehak, How Montgomery County Could Keep Sinking, HOUS. CHRON. (updated
Nov. 5, 2018, 9:18 PM), https://perma.cc/B3XD-5WUC; ADRIAN MCINNIS ET AL.,
footnote continued on next page
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There are also now areas where practices are changing. In Washington
State, for example, the Washington Department of Ecology and the Nature
Conservancy have partnered on a “Floodplains by Design” program designed to
reintroduce rivers to surrounding floodplains.181 The Natural Resource
Conservation Service has spent millions of dollars purchasing flooding
easements from willing landowners in flood-prone areas,182 and while the
regulatory criteria for selecting purchased lands do not include groundwaterrecharge potential,183 at least some of the resulting flooding is likely to
recharge aquifers.184 More recently, California’s Central Valley Flood
Protection Board adopted policies designed to encourage reconnection of rivers
with their floodplains, partly with the goal of increasing groundwater
recharge.185 Some pilot projects show promising results.186 Yet these remain
isolated examples, and notably, the recharge benefits that occur generally
happen because government or nonprofit entities pay landowners to partially
restore recharge levels that their lands once provided for free.187 The idea that
anyone is obligated to allow floodplain recharge has not yet been part of the
legal discussion.
C. Forests and Fields
As the preceding sections show, law affects groundwater recharge by
regulating (or deliberately not regulating) development’s impacts on surfacewater runoff and by protecting (or deliberately not protecting) floodplains and

181.
182.

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

WATER INST. OF THE GULF, STATE OF THE SCIENCE TO SUPPORT LONG-TERM WATER
RESOURCE PLANNING 65 (2020), https://perma.cc/8Q3C-SHCD (describing historic
subsidence in the Baton Rouge area); Steve Hardy, Baton Rouge Water Company Says
Industry Needs to Stop Drawing Water from Aquifer, ADVOCATE (July 1, 2017, 4:02 PM),
https://perma.cc/SB2V-3EUE.
FLOODPLAINS BY DESIGN, https://perma.cc/5A7Y-7LMB (archived Mar. 11, 2021).
See 16 U.S.C. § 2203 (authorizing floodplain-easement purchases); see, e.g., NRCS Offers
More than $200 Million in Emergency Funding to Restore Flood-Prone Lands, TRI-STATE
LIVESTOCK NEWS (July 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/4376-V9SU.
See 7 C.F.R. § 624.10 (2020) (providing limited criteria for choosing lands and not
including groundwater-recharge potential).
See Emergency Watershed Protection Program, 70 Fed. Reg. 16,921, 16,925 (Apr. 4,
2005) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt. 624) (noting groundwater-recharge benefits).
See Matt Weiser, A Landmark California Plan Puts Floodplains Back in Business, NEW
HUMANITARIAN: WATER DEEPLY (Oct. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/3M2N-3AEK.
See, e.g., SWENSON ET AL., supra note 174 (describing the benefits of floodplain
restoration along California’s Cosumnes River).
See, e.g., EWP Floodplain Easement Program—Floodplain Easement Option (EWPP-FPE),
USDA NAT. RES. CONSERVATION SERV., https://perma.cc/6CH8-DCCJ (archived
Mar. 12, 2021) (describing the EWP Floodplain Easement Program, which relies on
voluntary easement purchases).
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temporary waterways. But collectively, developed areas, temporary
waterways, and floodplains make up a small portion of the landscapes
influenced by human activity. In many other areas, humans affect
groundwater recharge primarily by managing forests, rangelands, and farms.
These impacts should be important to a system of groundwater law, for most
of our precipitation falls on forests and agricultural lands,188 and much of that
precipitation is transpired by vegetation.189 Consequently, management of
those lands can either increase or decrease recharge levels, sometimes
significantly. With limited exceptions, however, law does not address these
impacts.
1.

Water and the woods

A comprehensive system of groundwater-recharge law would likely start
in the woods. Most of the United States’ freshwater flows begin in forests, and
in the western United States the proportion is even higher.190 Forests also
regulate the timing and amount of water flows.191 Most importantly, they
limit recharge because trees and other plants use water; much of the
precipitation that falls in forests is taken up by plants’ roots and transpired.192
But forests also facilitate recharge by covering the ground with decaying leaf
litter, into which water readily infiltrates and through which lateral overland

188. This is because most of our nondesert land is either forested, cultivated, or grazed. See

189.

190.
191.

192.

Cynthia Nickerson & Allison Borchers, How Is Land in the United States Used? A Focus
on Agricultural Land, ECON. RSCH. SERV., U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. (Mar. 1, 2012),
https://perma.cc/WDG2-2T5U (noting that in 2007, 51% of the United States’ land area
was in agricultural use); U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., U.S. FOREST RESOURCE FACTS AND
HISTORICAL TRENDS 7 (2014), https://perma.cc/VD7S-UQL3 (“In 2012, forest land
comprised 766 million acres, or 33 percent of the total land area of the United States.”).
There is some overlap between these two categories because some forested land is also
agricultural.
See Ronald L. Hanson, Evapotranspiration and Droughts, in NATIONAL WATER SUMMARY
1988-89—HYDROLOGIC EVENTS AND FLOODS AND DROUGHTS 99, 99 (Richard W. Paulson
et al., 1991).
U.S. DEP’T. OF AGRIC. ET AL., supra note 98, at 6 (“In the Western United States, 65
percent of the water supply comes from forests.”).
Katherine J. Elliott et al., Water Yield Following Forest-Grass-Forest Transitions, 21
HYDROLOGY & EARTH SYS. SCIS. 981, 981 (2017) (“Forests play a critical role in regulating
hydrological processes in headwater catchments by moderating the timing and
magnitude of streamflow.”).
See Matheussen et al., supra note 27, at 868 (“Removal of forest cover is known to
increase streamflow as a result of reduced evapotranspiration and to increase peak
flows as a result of higher water tables.”).
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flows are impeded.193 Additionally, the water that trees transpire can create
additional precipitation, and thus more recharge, further downwind.194
These activities are heavily impacted by human management of forests.
Generally speaking, a forest with more growing biomass will transpire more
water, which means that it will provide less recharge and less outflow.195
Consequently, human activities that create or thicken forests, like fire
suppression or forest planting, can reduce water supplies,196 while thinning
forests, letting them burn, or removing them entirely can enhance the quantity
(though often not the quality) of water supplies.197 These relationships are not
always consistent; logging a forest, for example, can lead to road building, soil
compaction, and more rapid snowmelt,198 which can reduce recharge. And
regenerating forests may actually transpire more water than the mature stands
they replace.199 Also, increasing water flows out of forests isn’t necessarily the
same as increasing groundwater recharge. Water may leave the forest
primarily as surface flow, and unless those surface flows enter zones where a
stream is losing water to its bed or floodplain (or to nearby irrigated areas),
those flows may not become groundwater again.200 Nevertheless, there are
many areas where the water that fills aquifers must first pass through a forest,

193. See van Noordwijk et al., supra note 79, at 33.
194. Id. at 35-36.
195. See Ge Sun et al., Impacts of Forest Biomass Removal on Water Yield Across the United States,

196.
197.

198.
199.
200.

in 2016 BILLION-TON REPORT: ADVANCING DOMESTIC RESOURCES FOR A THRIVING
BIOECONOMY—VOLUME 2, at 211, 212 (2017), https://perma.cc/J9QV-BTDW.
See van Noordwijk et al., supra note 79, at 43 (“[M]ost studies [of afforestation] reported
decreases in water yields following the intervention.”).
See Dennis W. Hallema et al., Burned Forests Impact Water Supplies, NATURE COMMC’NS,
Apr. 10, 2018, at 1, 2; Julia A. Jones et al., Forest Landscape Hydrology in a “New Normal”
Era of Climate and Land Use Change, in FOREST AND WATER ON A CHANGING PLANET,
supra note 79, at 81, 85 (describing the effects of timber harvesting).
See Jones et al., supra note 197, at 85.
See Elliott et al., supra note 191, at 988-90 (finding that a growing forest used more
water than a mature forest that had previously occupied the same land).
This is likely to be true in humid climates, where rivers and streams continue to gain
flow from surrounding groundwater over much of their course. It is less likely to be
true in places like the American West, where arid lowland climates and pumpingrelated aquifer depletion mean that many low-elevation watercourses are disconnected
from the water table. See Laura E. Condon & Reed M. Maxwell, Evaluating the
Relationship Between Topography and Groundwater Using Outputs from a Continental-Scale
Integrated Hydrology Model, 51 WATER RES. RSCH. 6602, 6610 fig.4 (2015) (showing
groundwater-table depth and flow direction in the western and eastern United States);
see also, e.g., Rebecca Nelson & Leon Szeptycki, Groundwater, Rivers, Ecosystems and
Conflicts, WATER IN THE WEST (updated Dec. 19, 2014), https://perma.cc/XE45-TBDT
(describing areas where groundwater pumping has depleted surface-water ecosystems).
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and human management of that forest partially determines the extent to
which those aquifers fill.201
For all of these reasons, one might expect water law and forest law to be
highly integrated. And in a few ways, they are and have been for a long time. In
the nineteenth century, in reaction to massive floods that followed widespread
clearcutting, the United States established its national forests.202 Managing
water flows was, and remains, a central purpose of federal forest law; indeed,
the Supreme Court once held that timber provision and water-flow
management were the only purposes for which the national forest system was
originally created.203 At the federal level, a series of additional statutes has
broadened the purposes of forest management and has created a procedural
framework for forest-management planning.204 Within that framework, the
sweeping and open-ended mandates of federal forest law leave ample room for
the Forest Service to make water management generally, and promotion of
groundwater recharge more specifically, a key component of its planning
goals.205 States, meanwhile, hold broad authority to regulate private and stateheld forest lands206 and could, in theory, use that authority to manage forests
with water management as a central goal.
In practice, however, forest-management and water law mostly occupy
different realms.207 Several subareas of forest law exemplify this disconnect.
One is fire-management policy. For decades, the Forest Service had a policy of
201. In California, for example, most precipitation falls, and recharge processes therefore

202.
203.
204.

205.

206.
207.

begin, in the forested Sierra Nevada and the Coast Ranges, but the significant aquifers
are in valleys. Claudia C. Faunt et al., Introduction, Overview of Hydrogeology, and Textural
Model of California’s Central Valley, in GROUNDWATER AVAILABILITY OF THE CENTRAL
VALLEY AQUIFER, CALIFORNIA 1, 21 fig.A9 (Claudia C. Faunt ed., 2009) (showing a cross
section of the Central Valley Aquifer).
U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ET AL., supra note 98, at 4 (describing the origins of the national
forests).
United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707-13 (1978).
See National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); Forest and Rangeland Renewable
Resource Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 Stat. 476 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1614); Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-517, 74
Stat. 215 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531).
See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (“It is the policy of the Congress that the national forests are
established and shall be administered for outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed,
and wildlife and fish purposes.”); id. § 1604(e), (g) (directing the Forest Service to factor
watersheds into forest management).
See Blake Hudson, Dynamic Forest Federalism, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1643, 1668-70
(2014).
See David Ellison et al., Governance Options for Addressing Changing Forest-Water
Relations, in FOREST AND WATER ON A CHANGING PLANET, supra note 79, at 147, 151
(“[F]orest-water interactions have been almost entirely ignored in the management of
global freshwater resources.”).
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aggressive fire suppression, which meant trying to put out every fire in the
forests as quickly as possible.208 That policy thickened forests, sometimes
dramatically,209 and may have reduced the amount of water exiting those
forests.210 But only recently has the Forest Service begun paying attention to
the water-management implications of its fire-suppression policies, and the
Forest Service still treats those implications as a matter to which attention is
discretionary rather than as a field involving legal obligations.211 Outside of
the southeastern United States, where prescribed burning has been a common
practice for decades, many states and private landholders are just as committed
to fire suppression as the Forest Service.212 That does not mean they succeed in
preventing fires; one of the hardest lessons of forest-fire policy has been that
suppression, in the long run, just makes the fires that do occur larger and more
catastrophic (which also means providing episodic and unpredictable boosts to
groundwater recharge and to surface-water flows).213 But the emphasis on fire
suppression has probably reduced past flows and, to the extent it is successful,
will continue to limit flows in the future.214
208. See Stephens & Sugihara, supra note 70, at 433-34.
209. See Aaron W. Fellows & Michael L. Goulden, Has Fire Suppression Increased the Amount

210.

211.
212.

213.

214.

of Carbon Stored in Western U.S. Forests?, GEOPHYSICAL RSCH. LETTERS, June 28, 2008, at 1,
1 (noting “a shift from sparser forests, which are dominated by a few large trees, to
denser forests, which are dominated by many small trees”).
The relationships are complicated because a denser forest may have fewer large trees
and therefore less overall biomass, see id., but a forest dominated by large trees may use
less water than one primarily composed of smaller, immature trees. See Elliott et al.,
supra note 191, at 987 (reporting findings “suggesting that the new forest used more
water (i.e., had higher [evapotranspiration]) than expected had it not undergone
treatment”).
See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. ET AL., supra note 98, at 52 (describing management options
but not legal obligations).
See Sophie Quinton & Alex Brown, California May Need More Fire to Fix Its Wildfire
Problem, PEW CHARITABLE TRS.: STATELINE (Sept. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/7XF22XK4 (describing disincentives for burning on nonfederal land); Fire, OR. DEP’T
FORESTRY, https://perma.cc/HA33-AGX8 (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (“ODF ’s firefighting
policy is straightforward: Put out fires quickly at the smallest possible size.”). On the
different policies in the southeast, see Jim Brenner & Dale Wade, Florida’s Revised
Prescribed Fire Law: Protection for Responsible Burners, in PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE
CONFERENCE 2000: THE FIRST NATIONAL CONGRESS ON FIRE ECOLOGY, PREVENTION, AND
MANAGEMENT 132, 133 (K.E.M. Galley et al. eds., 2003) (“Florida has led the nation in
acreage treated with prescribed fire every year since records have been kept . . . .”).
See Stephen J. Pyne, Between Two Fires: The Past and Future of Fire in America, 18 PENN
ST. ENV’T L. REV. 129, 134-36 (2010) (describing the unraveling of fire suppression);
Scott L. Stephens & Lawrence W. Ruth, Federal Forest-Fire Policy in the United States, 15
ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 532, 533 (2005).
See Gabrielle F.S. Boisramé et al., Restoring a Natural Fire Regime Alters the Water Balance
of a Sierra Nevada Catchment, 55 WATER RES. RSCH. 5751, 5766 (2019) (“The
reintroduction of a near-natural wildfire regime to the [Illilouette Creek Basin] has
footnote continued on next page
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Similarly, while the negative impact of timber harvesting upon water
quality has long been a subject of close legal attention (and deservedly so), the
complicated relationship between timber harvesting and water quantity rarely
becomes a focus of legal concern. The National Forest Management Act, for
example, speaks directly to limiting the impact of timber harvesting on water
quality, but says nothing specific about using forest management to augment
the quantity of flows.215 The Forest Service’s implementing regulations share
that same focus; they provide more detailed provisions for protecting
watersheds from timber harvesting, but they likewise say nothing specific
about using timber harvesting or fire policy to manage flow levels.216 State
laws are similar. California’s forest-management rules, for example, contain
many pages about protecting watersheds from timber-management practices
but again say nothing about groundwater recharge or about managing the
quantity of surface-water flows.217 Water law in at least one western state also
precludes land managers from claiming rights in additional flows created by
vegetation management.218 In Colorado, if a land manager removes invasive
tamarisk trees from a watershed, thus reducing transpiration, the “developed
water” produced by that activity is allocated under the normal rules of prior
appropriation, and the landowner has no special claim to the increased flow.219
This disconnect between forest and water policy is not unique to the United
States. In much of the world, forestry law is concerned primarily with timber
production, erosion control, biodiversity protection, and, more recently, carbon
sequestration.220 Affecting groundwater recharge, and water-flow levels more
generally, can be an important—and sometimes problematic—incidental

215.
216.

217.
218.
219.

220.

reduced transpiration, increased peak snowpack while leading to earlier snowmelt
overall, increased subsurface water storage in the basin, and is likely to have increased
streamflow.”).
See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g).
See 36 C.F.R. § 219.8(a)(2) (2020) (requiring forest-management plans to address water
quality and the ecological integrity of within-forest streams but establishing no clear
requirements for addressing flows out of the forest).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, §§ 916-916.12, 936-936.12, 956-956.12 (2021).
See Se. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321, 1325 (Colo.
1974) (en banc).
Id. (“[T]hirsty men cannot step into the shoes of a ‘water thief ’ (the phreatophytes.) . . .
The property (the water) must return from whence it comes—the river—and thereon
down the line to those the river feeds in turn.”).
See Ellison et al., supra note 207, at 151 (“To date, the traditional paradigm has been to
manage forests for their ability to provide biomass, for their multi-functional uses,
and/or for their ability to sequester carbon.”).

1199

Law, Land Use, and Groundwater Recharge
73 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (2021)

consequence of forest policy.221 But it has rarely been an element of legal
frameworks. There are exceptions; South Africa, for example, requires
developers of tree plantations to obtain water-supply permits.222 But in most
places, forest law and water-quantity law lack purposeful integration.
2.

Agriculture, irrigated and otherwise

Just as forests have a complex relationship with groundwater, so does
agricultural activity. In the United States and around the world, agriculture is
the primary use of groundwater.223 It also is often the most problematic use;
the most extreme groundwater crises tend to occur in places, like California’s
San Joaquin Valley or the High Plains’ Ogallala Aquifer, where use is primarily
agricultural.224 But even as it sometimes depletes aquifers, agriculture also can
augment groundwater recharge. In some dryland agricultural areas, that
increased recharge occurs because planted crops transpire less water than the
vegetation they replace.225 In irrigated areas, the recharge may come from
excess application of water to crops.226 That water may be from the same
aquifer to which the recharge returns, and the recharge thus may just partially
offset the depletion caused by groundwater pumping. Alternatively, the
recharge may come from imported surface water and thus may increase aquifer
storage—sometimes problematically, to the point of flooding crops—though it
does so at the expense of surface flows someplace else.227
In theory, law could address these complicated interactions in several
ways. Most obviously, state and local land-use laws determine where

221. See, e.g., Shixiong Cao et al., Greening China Naturally, 40 AMBIO 828, 829 (2011)

222.
223.

224.
225.
226.
227.

(describing the problematic and unanticipated water-supply impacts of China’s
afforestation policies).
Bhaskar Vira et al., Management Options for Dealing with Changing Forest-Water
Relations, in FOREST AND WATER ON A CHANGING PLANET, supra note 79, at 121, 135.
See The Basics: What Is Groundwater?, GROUNDWATER FOUND., https://perma.cc/R4X5ZRC7 (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (providing statistics on groundwater use in the United
States); Facts About Global Groundwater Usage, NAT’L GROUND WATER ASS’N,
https://perma.cc/26AQ-FGW6 (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (“About 70% of groundwater
withdrawn worldwide is used for agriculture.”).
See Groundwater Decline and Depletion, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://perma.cc/V4X247Y4 (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (mapping locations with heavy groundwater depletion).
See Han et al., supra note 65, at 546.
Id. at 547.
See, e.g., Firebaugh Canal Co. v. United States, 203 F.3d 568, 570-72 (9th Cir. 2000)
(describing drainage problems caused by irrigating lands in California’s San Joaquin
Valley). The same combination of depletion in one place and excess water in another
can arise if groundwater is pumped from below a confining layer and then recharges a
shallow aquifer.

1200

Law, Land Use, and Groundwater Recharge
73 STAN. L. REV. 1163 (2021)

agriculture can occur and where competing land uses cannot occur,228 and
much of the field of surface-water law governs deliveries of irrigation water.229
Both fields therefore incidentally help determine the locations and amounts of
agriculture-related groundwater recharge. Additionally, as water law
increasingly focuses on the efficiency of water use (and as technology makes
efficient water use more feasible), it will necessarily limit the extent of
groundwater recharge.230 More specifically, land-use and water laws might
create incentives for maximizing the benefits of agricultural recharge while
minimizing its associated problems. That might mean, for example, trying to
encourage irrigators to time applications of water so that recharge will
augment dry-season surface flows.231 Alternatively, it might mean asking
irrigators who switch to lower-recharge practices to address the associated
impacts to water uses that have come to depend on the recharge from prior
practices.232
But with agricultural use, as with other areas of groundwater-recharge
law, impacts upon recharge are addressed, if at all, primarily as the incidental
consequences of laws focused on other matters. Policies that help determine
where agriculture occurs, for example, generally focus on limiting
development in prime agricultural areas; promoting groundwater recharge is
not part of the calculus.233 Similarly, states generally assign water rights
without considering the effects of surface-water diversions on groundwater-

228. See Teri E. Popp, A Survey of Governmental Response to the Farmland Crisis: States’

229.

230.

231.

232.

233.

Application of Agricultural Zoning, 11 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 515, 521-34 (1988-1989)
(describing relationships between farming and zoning powers).
See generally BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY, ROBERT H. ABRAMS & SANDRA B.
ZELLMER, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS (6th ed. 2018)
(including dozens of cases involving irrigators).
See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 371-72, 374 (2011) (describing Montana’s
allegations that increased agricultural-water-use efficiency led to reduced seepage and
thus to lower Yellowstone River flows).
See, e.g., George Kourakos et al., Increasing Groundwater Availability and Seasonal Base
Flow Through Agricultural Managed Aquifer Recharge in an Irrigated Basin, 55 WATER
RES. RSCH. 7464, 7464, 7486-87 (2019) (examining the potential for seasonal recharge in
California’s Central Valley); Helen E. Dahlke et al., Managed Winter Flooding of Alfalfa
Recharges Groundwater with Minimal Crop Damage, 72 CAL. AGRIC. 65, 65-66 (2018)
(proposing managed flooding of agricultural fields as a recharge mechanism).
But see infra notes 235-38 and accompanying text (discussing laws that allow irrigators
to salvage recharged irrigation water without worrying about impacts on downstream
or downgradient users).
See, e.g., Prime Farmland and Farmland of Statewide Importance, CAL. DEP’T
CONSERVATION, https://perma.cc/X3J5-HA5F (archived Apr. 16, 2021) (describing the
criteria for designating farmland without mentioning the potential to promote aquifer
recharge).
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recharge levels.234 Even in places where irrigation-related recharge is highly
problematic—which can happen where excess recharge raises the water table,
flooding and often polluting plants’ root zones—regulators do not factor that
recharge into their assessment of the underlying surface-water right.
There is one water-rights doctrine that has more direct implications for
agricultural recharge. In the western United States, the doctrine of recapture
allows surface-water irrigators to reclaim surface water that recharged
groundwater.235 In other words, even after irrigation water has leaked through
irrigation ditches or percolated below plants’ root zones, that water remains
part of the surface-water right, and the rightsholder can pump it back to the
surface and reuse it.236 As a closely related corollary to that rule, a surfacewater-right holder also may change to different water-use practices, even if
that means the quantity of groundwater recharge on her land decreases, and
even if downgradient or downstream water users or ecosystems have come to
rely on the recharge generated by the old water-use practices.237 Those human
users and ecosystems may use the recharge as long as it remains present, but
they cannot demand its continuation.238
For a water-rights system, the doctrine of recapture has some important
advantages. It allows water-right holders to reap the benefits of increased
water-use efficiency, rather than locking them into practices that generate
recharge but do so through excess water applications or leaky infrastructure.
234. See, e.g., Wash. State Dep’t of Ecology, Guidance to Applicants for New Water Right

235.

236.

237.

238.

Permits: Instructions for Form No. ECY 040-1-14A (2020), https://perma.cc/QEA3J3RG (explaining the required elements for a permit application, which do not include
a discussion of recharge associated with water use); Ariz. Dep’t of Water Res.,
Application Guidelines: Permit to Appropriate Public Water of the State of Arizona or
to Construct a Reservoir 7 (2016), https://perma.cc/LC3B-3BJE (requiring a discussion
of groundwater recharge, but only if the project is specifically designed as a recharge
project).
See, e.g., Montana, 563 U.S. at 380-81; Barker v. Sonner, 294 P. 1053, 1054 (Or. 1931) (en
banc) (“[A]n appropriator is justified in recapturing waste water remaining upon his
land . . . .”).
See, e.g., United States v. Haga, 276 F. 41, 43 (D. Idaho 1921) (stating that the rights of
surface-water appropriators extend “to what is commonly known as wastage from
surface run-off and deep percolation”); Bidleman v. Short, 150 P. 834, 836 (Nev. 1915)
(“So long as such waters exist upon their lands, it is their property . . . .”).
See Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Long, 773 P.2d 988, 996-97 (Ariz. 1989) (en banc) (“If the senior
appropriator, through scientific and technical advances, can utilize his water so that
none is wasted, no other appropriator can complain.”).
See, e.g., Stevens v. Oakdale Irrigation Dist., 90 P.2d 58, 61 (Cal. 1939) (en banc) (per
curiam) (“It is the general rule, probably subject to exceptions not here involved, that
the producer of an artificial flow is for the most part under no obligation to lower
claimants to continue to maintain it.”); Lambeye v. Garcia, 157 P. 977, 978-79 (Ariz.
1916) (“[W]hile the water so denominated as waste water may be used after it escapes,
no permanent right can be acquired to have the discharge kept up . . . .”).
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Relatedly, it facilitates transfers of water to higher-value users; many transfers
occur because agricultural users adopt more efficient practices and then sell the
saved water.239 But the doctrine accomplishes these beneficial outcomes at the
expense of potential reliance interests in groundwater recharge. More
generally, it continues the theme, which is reflected across many areas of
water-related law, of treating groundwater recharge as an incidental
consequence of doctrines and practices focused on other aspects of water
management.
D. Managed Aquifer Recharge
A recurring theme of the discussion so far has been law’s indifference, or
just glancing attention, to groundwater recharge. But there are management
practices that take a very different approach, and they come with an emerging
body of law. Increasingly, water managers are turning to a practice known as
managed aquifer recharge (MAR) to improve management of water
supplies.240
MAR generally involves using empty aquifer space to store water from
some other source.241 Typically the source is surface water,242 though some
MAR projects rely on groundwater from other aquifers243 or on treated
municipal wastewater.244 The project managers typically use discrete
infrastructure—often infiltration basins or injection wells—to place the water
in the subsurface.245 Many projects are run by water districts, which develop
239. See PETER W. CULP, ROBERT GLENNON & GARY LIBECAP, HAMILTON PROJECT & STANFORD

240.

241.
242.

243.

244.

245.

WOODS INST. FOR THE ENV’T, DISCUSSION PAPER 2014-05, SHOPPING FOR WATER: HOW THE
MARKET CAN MITIGATE WATER SHORTAGES IN THE AMERICAN WEST 7 (2014) (explaining
how markets can create incentives for increased water-use efficiency).
See generally COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF RECOVERABLE
WATER, NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 15 (describing MAR
concepts and projects).
See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF WATER RES., supra note 96, at 12 (defining “managed aquifer
recharge”).
See, e.g., Anita Milman et al., Groundwater Recharge for Water Security: The Arizona Water
Bank, Arizona, 5 CASE STUD. ENV’T, no. 1, 2021, at 1, 1 (describing how the Arizona
Water Bank stores water diverted from the Colorado River).
E.g., Aquifer Storage & Recovery, SAN ANTONIO WATER SYS., https://perma.cc/L97FPVNQ (last updated Mar. 11, 2021) (describing a program to store excess Edwards
Aquifer water in another aquifer).
E.g., What Is SWIFT?, HRSD, https://perma.cc/49NE-9UDR (archived Apr. 20, 2021)
(describing the Hampton Roads Sanitary District’s Sustainable Water Initiative for
Tomorrow (SWIFT), which uses recharge of treated wastewater to combat saltwater
intrusion in a coastal Virginia aquifer).
See COMM. ON SUSTAINABLE UNDERGROUND STORAGE OF RECOVERABLE WATER, NAT’L
RSCH. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., supra note 15, at 27-29 (describing recharge
methods); see also, e.g., Recharge and Recovery, KERN WATER BANK AUTH.,
footnote continued on next page
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the projects primarily or exclusively for their own use,246 but others function
as shared banks, which multiple participating agencies or third parties may use
for water deposits and withdrawals.247 Any MAR project requires systems of
monitoring and accounting as well as physical infrastructure, especially
because these MAR projects typically use aquifers where other landowners
hold rights to native groundwater.248 States generally treat the MAR water as
legally separate from that native groundwater—legally, it is classified as stored
surface water249—but the physical commingling of the two resources can
create some accounting challenges and complex legal questions.250
A full discussion of the variety of MAR projects and the legal frameworks
needed for their success is a subject for a different article.251 For present
purposes, two key points should suffice. The first is that MAR projects come in
a wide variety of forms. Some involve diversion of surface water and
infiltration at discrete and limited sites, but other projects involve the kinds of
land-use practices that have been the primary focus of this Article; they have
used deliberate flooding of agricultural fields,252 removal of invasive

246.

247.

248.

249.

250.
251.
252.

https://perma.cc/9QNZ-5FX5 (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (explaining how water is
recharged into storage in Kern County, California).
See, e.g., Kathleen Miller et al., An Urban Drought Reserve Enabled by State Groundwater
Recharge Legislation: The Bear Canyon Recharge Project, Albuquerque, New Mexico, 5 CASE
STUD. ENV’T, no. 1, 2021, at 1, 1 (describing a project run by a single water district for
the benefit of a single city).
See, e.g., Michael Kiparsky et al., Groundwater Recharge for a Regional Water Bank: Kern
Water Bank, Kern County, California, 5 CASE STUD. ENV’T, no. 1, 2021, at 1, 4-9
(describing the Kern Water Bank, which provides storage capacity to multiple member
agencies and also allows those agencies to market their stored water); Groundwater
Banking, SEMITROPIC WATER STORAGE DIST., https://perma.cc/E6V5-TPWU (archived
Mar. 12, 2021) (describing another southern California groundwater bank).
See William Blomquist et al., Institutions and Conjunctive Water Management Among
Three Western States, 41 NAT. RES. J. 653, 657-59 (2001) (describing these challenges and
the advantages of clear rights in stored water).
See GREGORY A. THOMAS, NAT. HERITAGE INST., DESIGNING SUCCESSFUL GROUNDWATER
BANKING PROGRAMS IN THE CENTRAL VALLEY: LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCE 21-22 (2001),
https://perma.cc/UNL7-32AL (describing the legal status of banked water).
See Blomquist et al., supra note 248, at 658-59 (describing these challenges).
I have separated out MAR in large part because MAR law is primarily surface-water law,
while the focus of this Article is on the intersection of land-use and groundwater law.
See, e.g., Richard G. Niswonger et al., Managed Aquifer Recharge Through Off-Season
Irrigation in Agricultural Regions, 53 WATER RES. RSCH. 6970, 6971 (2017) (describing
“Ag-MAR” projects); Helen E. Dahlke et al., Managed Aquifer Recharge as a Tool to
Enhance Sustainable Groundwater Management in California: Examples from Field and
Modeling Studies, in ADVANCES IN CHEMICAL POLLUTION, ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT AND PROTECTION: ADVANCED TOOLS FOR INTEGRATED WATER
MANAGEMENT 215, 245-46 (Jan Friesen & Leonor Rodríguez-Sinobas eds., 2018)
(providing a case study from California’s Kings River Basin).
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vegetation,253 and recharge of municipal wastewater and stormwater
runoff.254 In one of the most innovative projects, water managers in
California’s Pajaro Valley have created a “recharge net metering” system,
whereby landowners who augment groundwater recharge can obtain
reductions in their otherwise substantial groundwater pumping fees.255 The
second point is that many MAR projects are modest in scale, at least compared
to overall volumes of groundwater storage and use.256 With some notable
exceptions,257 they typically cover limited areas, and they often are run by a
single entity or a limited set of participants.258 Because of that modest scale, the
vast majority of the world’s groundwater recharge occurs outside of MAR
projects, and most groundwater users cannot take advantage of a MAR
project.259 Consequently, while the law of MAR projects is complicated and
likely to be increasingly important, a study of groundwater-recharge law that
focuses solely on MAR projects would miss much of the action.

253. See, e.g., Nature Conservancy, Case Study: Ventura County; Removing Arundo donax

254.
255.
256.

257.

258.
259.

to Improve Groundwater Supply and Enhance Habitat (2019), https://perma.cc/9N377ELR (describing an invasive-species-removal program).
E.g., Groundwater Management, ORANGE CNTY. WATER DIST., https://perma.cc/HG48QPEA (archived Mar. 12, 2021).
See MICHAEL KIPARSKY ET AL., RECHARGE NET METERING TO ENHANCE GROUNDWATER
SUSTAINABILITY 2 (2018), https://perma.cc/GPA8-9CW6.
See, e.g., Res. Conservation Dist. of Santa Cruz Cnty. et al., Recharge Net Metering
(ReNeM) in the Pajaro Valley 2 (2017), https://perma.cc/R47H-8ZQQ (noting the
program’s goal to “generate ~1000 ac-ft/yr in total of infiltration benefit”); Miller et al.,
supra note 246, at 1 (describing a small project in New Mexico). Water managers often
estimate that an acre-foot of water can supply up to two households for one year. See Acre
Foot, WATER EDUC. FOUND., https://perma.cc/DH9D-RJ8K (archived Mar. 12, 2021).
Using that estimate, 2,000 acre-feet would only be enough to supply a small town.
E.g., Groundwater Banking, supra note 247 (stating that the Semitropic Groundwater
Storage Bank “[c]an store a total of 1.65 million acre feet—enough water to meet the
yearly needs of approximately 3.3 million households”).
See, e.g., Aquifer Storage & Recovery, supra note 243 (describing a project managed by a
single water district); What Is SWIFT?, supra note 244 (same).
One comparison illustrates this disparity. The Kern Water Bank, which is one of
California’s few large-scale MAR projects, received approximately 2.5 million acre-feet
of water for recharge between 1995 and 2017, for an annual average of just under
109,000 acre-feet. See Kiparsky et al., supra note 247, at 4. That is a large amount of
water, but in the Tulare Lake Basin—the California region in which the Kern Water
Bank is located—average groundwater use is approximately 6.185 million acre-feet
per year, according to California Department of Water Resources statistics. See
California’s Groundwater, MAVEN’S NOTEBOOK, at fig.2-8 (updated Apr. 1, 2020),
https://perma.cc/WF9B-BNTP (to view statistics, click “California’s groundwater use
by the numbers”).
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III. The Future of Groundwater-Recharge Law
A key point of this Article so far has been that law is largely indifferent to
groundwater recharge. This Part turns from describing that state of affairs to
asking whether the status quo is appropriate and how things might be
different. Those inquiries break down into three sub-questions. First, what
circumstances would justify a more robust and intentional legal regime for
groundwater recharge? Second, what ethic should underpin groundwaterrecharge regimes? And third, what legal instruments might more robust
systems of groundwater-recharge law use? The answers to each question will
be contextual; the heterogeneity of groundwater hydrology and its human
influences means that one-size-fits-all regimes have little promise in this
realm. Nevertheless, the discussion that follows provides a framework for the
development of more site-specific regimes and, more generally, for more
functional groundwater-recharge law.
A. The Circumstances for Groundwater-Recharge Law
Any effort at developing groundwater-recharge law should begin with a
threshold question: Is such law worth having at all? Or, to put it somewhat
more precisely: Is there need for a set of laws targeted at groundwater recharge,
or is the currently prevalent system, in which groundwater-recharge law
exists primarily as an incidental consequence of other legal goals, adequate to
the task at hand?
Similar questions often arise with natural resources,260 and they are not
new to the field of groundwater law, but they have arisen more often for
groundwater pumping than for recharge.261 In 1861, for example, the Ohio
Supreme Court explained why it was rejecting any common law limitations on
groundwater extraction:
Because the existence, origin, movement and course of such waters, and the causes
which govern and direct their movements, are so secret, occult and concealed . . . an
attempt to administer any set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in
hopeless uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible.262

260. See, e.g., Jianlin Chen, Optimal Property Rights for Emerging Natural Resources: A Case

Study on Owning Atmospheric Moisture, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 47 (2016); Alan J.
Alexander, Note, The Texas Wind Estate: Wind as a Natural Resource and a Severable
Property Interest, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 429 (2011); Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights, 89 B.U.
L. REV. 1217 (2009).
261. For a case exemplifying this absence of regulation, see Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150,
152-54 (Me. 1999) (declining to abandon the absolute-dominion rule, which allows
unregulated and unlimited groundwater pumping).
262. Frazier v. Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates
Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324, 327 (Ohio 1984).
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Much of the law of groundwater extraction derives from scientists’ and then
lawmakers’ increasing rejection of these beliefs.263 But for groundwater
recharge, with all its complexities and uncertainties, the challenges of
administration can still be substantial.
A classic theoretical framework for answering the questions posed above
comes from the work of economist Harold Demsetz.264 He posited that
property-rights regimes emerge when the costs of an open-access regime begin
to exceed the costs of dividing the resource between holders of defined
rights.265 So, for example, when scarcity makes a previously abundant resource
more valuable, resource users may decide that the process of defining rights in
the resource is worth the associated transaction costs.266 Subsequent theorists
have critiqued, expanded upon, and refined this theory.267 Some expanders
have pointed out that the theory might explain the emergence of a variety of
governance regimes, not just systems of property rights.268 Meanwhile, critics
have pointed out that the theory may do better as a normative account
explaining when governance regimes ought to emerge than as a descriptive
account explaining when they actually will.269 Politics, they argue, can play
more of a causal role than aggregate economic utility.270 But as a commonsense
metric for judging when groundwater-recharge governance would be helpful,
Demsetz’s focus on transaction costs and externalities still works reasonably
263. See Owen, supra note 7, at 266-71, 268 n.102, 269 nn.111-12 (describing groundwater-

264.

265.

266.
267.
268.
269.

270.

pumping laws’ uneven evolution toward heightened regulation); Marion Rice
Kirkwood, Appropriation of Percolating Water, 1 STAN. L. REV. 1, 11 (1948) (describing
the emergence of statutory regimes for the management of groundwater pumping).
Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, AM. ECON. REV., May 1967, at 347;
see also Thomas W. Merrill, Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S331, S331 (2002).
See Demsetz, supra note 264, at 350 (“[P]roperty rights develop to internalize
externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of
internalization.”).
See id. at 351-53 (discussing the emergence of property rights in furs).
See generally Merrill, supra note 264, at S333-35 (describing some of that literature).
See Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property
Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453, S464 (2002).
See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL
STUD. S421, S429 (2002) (arguing that interest-group politics also provides a plausible
origin story for property rights); see also James E. Krier, Essay, Evolutionary Theory and
the Origin of Property Rights, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 139, 143 (2009) (“Even if Toward a
Theory of Property Rights has little if any theory about the evolution of property rights,
it can be used to illuminate the subject.”).
See Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S359, S360-61,
S370-71 (2002) (noting that societies may just “reallocate property rights when some
exogenous political realignment enables a powerful group to grab a larger share of the
pie” and providing theories about how this might happen).
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well. The key question, then, is whether the benefits of creating that regime
will outweigh the associated burdens.
Sometimes the answer to this question will be no. There are places—rural
Maine, for example—where groundwater is so abundant that there is no need
for the government to regulate the quantity of recharge.271 Conversely, in
some deserts, groundwater scarcity is a problem, but there is essentially no
recharge to manage.272
Even where scarcity is present, the costs of legal intervention will still
sometimes outweigh the benefits. There are two primary reasons why. First,
any effective groundwater-recharge regime is likely to require information
about the amounts and locations of groundwater recharge, and that
information may be difficult to obtain.273 Regulators might compensate for
that difficulty by using workable generalizations—perhaps grounded in
simulation models—rather than site-specific data.274 But reaching even those
workable generalizations takes effort, and individual landowners are likely to
object whenever the generalizations arguably do not apply.275 Second, even
where scarcity exists and there is enough information to support a legal
regime, lawmakers might reasonably worry about the negative externalities
associated with regulation. If, for example, laws designed to enhance
groundwater recharge would encourage otherwise problematic practices, like

271. See, e.g., Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 152, 154 (Me. 1999) (noting an absence of

272.

273.

274.

275.

evidence that the “absolute dominion rule,” which rejects any property-rights
limitation on groundwater pumping, has been flawed in Maine).
See, e.g., Mojave Groundwater Resources, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., https://perma.cc/9YDAMGVD (archived Mar. 12, 2021) (“Recharge to the groundwater system from direct
infiltration of precipitation is minimal.”).
See LAUREN EVERETT, NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G & MED., GROUNDWATER RECHARGE
AND FLOW: APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES FOR MONITORING AND MODELING USING
REMOTELY SENSED DATA 1-2 (2019), https://perma.cc/LGG7-85F6 (describing the
importance and complexities of groundwater data).
See generally Ajay Singh, Groundwater Resources Management Through the Applications of
Simulation Modeling: A Review, SCI. TOTAL ENV’T, Nov. 15, 2014, at 415 (describing the
evolution and types of groundwater models). On the advantages and disadvantages of
regulating through proxy measures and simulation models, see generally Robert L.
Glicksman, Bridging Data Gaps Through Modeling and Evaluation of Surrogates: Use of the
Best Available Science to Protect Biological Diversity Under the National Forest Management
Act, 83 IND. L.J. 465 (2008); and James D. Fine & Dave Owen, Technocracy and Democracy:
Conflicts Between Models and Participation in Environmental Law and Planning, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 901 (2005) (describing challenges with air-quality modeling).
I have heard modelers lament this tendency to focus on “my favorite pixel”; they worry
that people are holding models to a false standard of perfection. But one can understand
why people might judge a model based on its specific application to places they know—
or own.
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increasing surface-water diversions or accelerating harvests of forests, a
laissez-faire regime may be the better choice.276
Nevertheless, there are likely to be many places where the informational
challenges of developing a legal regime are worth confronting. Southern
California provides a classic example. The region’s water-supply challenges are
famous, but heavy storms do hit southern California, particularly in its
mountainous areas, and those storms create surges of surface flow that
recharge the region’s large aquifers.277 The extent to which that recharge
happens will depend upon vegetation management in the mountains and on
urban development; it is sensitive to human intervention.278 In such a place,
the scarcity that favors legal governance of recharge clearly does exist.
Additionally, the data challenges that might undermine regulatory
interventions are diminishing,279 or at least could diminish if political will is
present. Groundwater monitoring and modeling are evolving sciences, and
remote-sensing technologies now allow levels of precision and accuracy that
were unthinkable a generation or two ago.280 Additionally, many
groundwater-data gaps reflect political choices rather than scientific
challenges. The frequent unavailability of pumping data is one obvious
example.281 One challenge for a groundwater-recharge regime would likely be
the absence of such data; it is hard to determine the effectiveness of recharge
276. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting that permanently removing forests

277.

278.

279.
280.
281.

might be effective for enhancing groundwater recharge and problematic for many
other reasons). Prohibitions on this sort of action could be included in the legal regime,
of course, and they might be effective. But they also could make the legal regime more
complicated, which might diminish its value.
See, e.g., Mojave Groundwater Resources, supra note 272 (noting that aquifers in the
Mojave Desert receive recharge from ephemeral surface-water flows out of the
surrounding mountains); GREGORY C. LINES, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV., WATERRESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS REP. NO. 95-4189, GROUND-WATER AND SURFACE-WATER
RELATIONS ALONG THE MOJAVE RIVER, SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 41 (1996),
https://perma.cc/7QXK-PBNT (“The flood-plain aquifer receives virtually all of its
recharge from the river, and most of the water originates in the headwaters.”); see also
Jobbágy et al., supra note 44, at 679 (“More-distant sources of recharge are particularly
significant in arid regions located downstream of water-yielding mountains.”); Scanlon
et al., supra note 38, at 3345-46 (finding that recharge in the American Southwest often
occurs in mountains or at mountain fronts).
See Kinoshita & Hogue, supra note 71, at 5-6 (finding a relationship between fires and
water flows); NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL & PAC. INST., NO. 14-05-G, STORMWATER CAPTURE
POTENTIAL IN URBAN AND SUBURBAN CALIFORNIA 6 (2014), https://perma.cc/Q5AY-S9XF.
See EVERETT, supra note 273, at 3-6 (describing older and emerging technologies).
See generally id. (describing the capabilities but also the limitations of emerging
technologies).
See François Molle et al., The Local and National Politics of Groundwater Overexploitation,
11 WATER ALTERNATIVES 445, 450 (2018) (providing examples of United States regions
and other countries where groundwater pumping is poorly managed and monitored).
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practices without knowing how much water is stored within an aquifer and
how much is coming out. And those data are often missing not because of some
technological limitation—well meters have existed for a long time—but
because many groundwater users prefer to have their pumping remain
unmonitored and because lawmakers have acquiesced to that preference.282
Similarly, while externalities or offsetting effects might make regulatory
intervention inappropriate in some places, there are other places where
regulation ought to create win-win scenarios. For one example, consider a
coastal urban area where groundwater is an important water-supply source,
interrupted recharge is contributing to declining water tables (and surfacewater flooding), and those declining water levels are causing land subsidence,
seawater intrusion, and the potential loss of the area’s water supply. In such a
place, groundwater-recharge regulation could be crucial to the city’s survival.
Worldwide, millions of people live in places, like Houston or Jakarta, that fit
that description.283
Cape Town, South Africa, exemplifies another type of circumstance in
which groundwater-recharge law could be crucially important. In 2018, the
city nearly ran out of water.284 The crisis arose partly because non-native
vegetation had increased transpiration levels and decreased recharge
throughout much of the watershed that supplies the city.285 In such a location,
developing a legal structure for recharge management is exceedingly
important. And Cape Town is not the only place where legal interventions
targeted at vegetation management could be valuable. In the western United
States, recharge-promoting policies also might mesh well with reformed firemanagement strategies, leaving many areas with more water, healthier
ecosystems, and less risk of catastrophic fire.286
These examples illustrate a broader point. In a world where groundwater
is crucially important and frequently over-tapped, and where populations are

282. See EVERETT, supra note 273, at 3 (“In many cases, political restrictions exacerbate [data
283.

284.
285.
286.

gaps]; wells may be monitored, but the data are not made available.”).
See Amanda Ruggeri, The Ambitious Plan to Stop the Ground from Sinking, BBC: FUTURE
(Dec. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/ZQ7V-GQGX (describing subsidence problems around
the world—and the use of recharge programs as a partial response). For a general
description of the challenges of coastal-aquifer management, see generally Holly A.
Michael et al., Science, Society, and the Coastal Groundwater Squeeze, 53 WATER RES. RSCH.
2610 (2017).
See NATURE CONSERVANCY & WATER FUNDS FOR AFR., supra note 69, at 11 (noting that
Cape Town narrowly escaped “Day Zero,” when taps stop running).
See id. at 20-21, 28 (estimating water-yield losses caused by invasive species at 55 billion
liters per year).
See generally Boisramé et al., supra note 214 (describing the advantages of a more natural
fire regime).
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growing and the climate is changing, there will be places where people cannot
afford not to have groundwater-recharge law.
B. A Groundwater-Recharge Ethic
In Frazier v. Brown,287 the decision that accorded groundwater movements
“occult” status, the Ohio Supreme Court did not rest its rule of nonregulation
solely on scientific uncertainty. Instead, and somewhat less colorfully, it also
warned that groundwater-use regulation would inappropriately interfere with
economic development.288 That claim underscores the importance of a second
key question for groundwater-recharge law: What sort of ethic should
underpin such laws? The question in turn incorporates two somewhat
overlapping questions. First, what sort of ethical relationship between
different groups of people should be embodied in groundwater-recharge law?
Second, what sort of environmental ethic should that law contain?
Answers to these questions already are embedded, largely implicitly, in the
laws—and legal gaps—that touch on groundwater recharge. Like the Ohio
Supreme Court’s opinion in Frazier, those answers generally reflect a laissez-faire
ethic favoring landowners’ discretion rather than the protection of water rights
and natural systems. The implicit ethic embedded in the common-enemy rule,
for example, favors governmental nonintervention—not just from regulatory
agencies but also from courts—in the actions of landowners.289 By denying
downhill or downstream landowners any claim against their neighbors’ surfacewater management, the common-enemy rule effectively says that upstream
landowners can do as they will and downstream landowners (and water-right
holders) will respond as they must.290 That same ethic is implicit in most existing
groundwater-recharge laws’ treatment of the natural environment. By
establishing almost no requirements for maintaining or enhancing recharge that
provides environmental benefits—and by providing no rewards for landowners
who do create such benefits—groundwater-recharge law suggests that a
landowner’s autonomy to manage his or her own land counts more than affected
natural systems or maintenance of the collective benefits of shared aquifers.291
287. 12 Ohio St. 294 (1861), overruled by Cline v. Am. Aggregates Corp., 474 N.E.2d 324, 327

(Ohio 1984).
288. Id. at 311.
289. See supra notes 109-18 and accompanying text.
290. See, e.g., Morrison v. Bucksport & Bangor R.R. Co., 67 Me. 353, 355-56 (1877) (“[A]ny

proprietor of land may control the flow of mere surface water over his own premises,
according to his own wants and interests, without obligation to any proprietor either
above or below. . . . If all this were not so, men could not reconstruct and utilize their
landed estates without infinite trouble and suits.”).
291. See supra Parts II.B-.C.1 (discussing how groundwater-recharge benefits are essentially
irrelevant to laws governing forests and floodplains).
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Interestingly, groundwater-recharge law largely maintains that ethic even when
it operates to the detriment of other property-rights holders. A water-right
holder generally has no claim against a landowner who changes cropping
patterns in ways that limit recharge, for example, or who eliminates leakage
upon which the rightsholder had come to rely.292
Other ethical frameworks are possible. As a modest adjustment,
groundwater-recharge law could favor different types of property owners; it
might prioritize the interests of landowners who are impacted by changed
runoff patterns rather than those who create the impacts. Or, alternatively,
groundwater-recharge law might prioritize previously established water-use
rights over landowners’ discretion to manage land surfaces.293 Both of these
changes would reflect an underlying preference for maintaining some form of
the status quo, or for protecting earlier-established rights, rather than for
promoting landowners’ discretion to change their land uses as they see fit.
Groundwater-recharge law also could favor more of a communitarian or
environmentalist ethic. Rather than simply trying to favor one class of private
property owners, or to minimize governmental involvement, groundwaterrecharge law could treat maintenance of shared aquifers—and the surface
waterways that aquifers support—as a collective responsibility.294 Some areas
of groundwater-recharge law do reflect such an ethic. Stormwatermanagement fees, for example, reflect an implicit judgment that stormwatermanagement is a collective good, the protection of which leads to
individualized obligations.295 But within the limited and inchoate field of
groundwater-recharge law, that is a relatively rare approach.
More widespread adoption of a communitarian environmental ethic would
make sense. On utilitarian grounds, it holds clear value—at least in situations
where groundwater is scarce and regulators could track recharge effectively
enough to administer a legal regime. Laissez-faire regimes for groundwater
recharge allow all kinds of externalities, some positive but many negative, and
provide no mechanism for compelling internalization of those costs. The likely
result is a series of decisions that make sense for individual landowners but not

292. See Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 380-81 (2011) (explaining the rule of recapture).
293. Many western states have already made this shift for groundwater and surface-water

rights. Where groundwater users once could pump without worrying about impacts
on surface water, both types of rights are now part of the same regulatory system, with
groundwater rights often subordinated because of their later origin. See, e.g., Blomquist
et al., supra note 248, at 674 (describing Colorado’s system).
294. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Essay, Water Rights and the Common Wealth, 26 ENV’T L. 27, 36-38
(1996) (arguing that water ethics should recognize and embrace humans’ roles in
natural and human communities).
295. For a general description of stormwater utilities, see Brisman, supra note 125.
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for collective welfare.296 An individual landowner, for example, might benefit if
levees isolate his land from a river’s floodplain and thus limit recharge on that
land, but that kind of decision may deprive the river of important dry-season
flows while also increasing flood risk, and the landowner has no reason to worry
about those costs.297 They literally can just be shifted downstream. Likewise,
individual decisions to develop land without regard to stormwater recharge may
make sense for the developers, but the collective consequences may be urban
flooding, the loss of important groundwater supplies, and the need for expensive
stormwater-management infrastructure.298
Nonutilitarian ethical theories lead—mostly—in similar directions. Any
ethic that values sustainability or functioning environmental systems carries the
corollary necessity of recognizing individual responsibility to maintain and
contribute to recharge. If, to quote the famous naturalist Aldo Leopold, “[a] thing
is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community,” then preserving groundwater recharge, and thus the streams and
wetlands it sustains, is often the right thing to do.299 Similarly, if ensuring
fairness and combatting social subordination is a key goal, then regulating
recharge-limiting activities—which often will be carried out by developers,
government agencies, major landowners, or other powerful actors, and will
often operate to the detriment of widely needed water supplies—again will often
make sense. Even if one leaves redistribution and environmental values to the
side, adopts a purely anthropocentric ethic, and argues that the primary goal of a
legal regime should be to protect property rights, the current nonregulatory
approach holds little justification. Practices that affect groundwater recharge
routinely affect, often adversely, other people’s rights in water and land, and
nonregulation amounts to valuing one set of property rights over other sets of
property rights, often without any justification other than inertia. Only if
governmental nonintervention is at the core of the ethical theory, rather than
serving as a means to accomplish some other goal, does treating groundwater
recharge as a subject unfit for legal governance make any sense.
Nevertheless, even if it makes sense to acknowledge collective
responsibility for groundwater-recharge protection, that raises a secondary
question. How far should individual landowners’ obligations to provide
collective benefits go? If a landowner is to be penalized for inhibiting recharge
296. See Richard A. Epstein, Holdouts, Externalities, and the Single Owner: One More Salute to

Ronald Coase, 36 J.L. & ECON. 553, 558-59 (1993) (explaining this classic account of how
externalities lead to suboptimal decisionmaking).
297. See supra notes 170-80 and accompanying text (describing how levees limit
groundwater recharge).
298. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
299. ALDO LEOPOLD, The Land Ethic, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC, WITH OTHER ESSAYS ON
CONSERVATION FROM ROUND RIVER 237, 240 (2d prtg. 1969).
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or rewarded for creating it, whoever is calculating the penalty or benefit must
ask, “compared to what?”300 In other words, the law must select some level of
recharge (or permissible range of levels) that would be appropriate for that
parcel and then must compare the actual level of recharge to that baseline level.
Selecting those baselines can be tricky. Setting a baseline requires navigating
thorny questions about ethics and feasibility as well as developing precise
measures, neither of which is easy.301 Imagine, for example, a land-use change
that increases recharge on property that has been used for timber production
for decades, and imagine also that the level of recharge on that property has
been less under timber production than it would have been under natural
conditions. Is the landowner entitled to claim a benefit because she has
increased recharge relative to preexisting conditions, or should she pay a
penalty because she has reduced recharge relative to natural conditions? There
are potential fairness and efficiency arguments in favor of either course, and
the answer isn’t obvious. Yet for a recharge regime to be functional, a baseline
is indispensable.
I would not suggest any universal answer to this question. Indeed, similar
questions recur throughout environmental and natural-resource law—they
come up, for example, any time lawmakers erect a cap-and-trade regime for
greenhouse gases or other pollutants—and legal systems’ answers are all over
the map.302 Nevertheless, several factors might inform a legal regime’s
approach to selecting baselines. First, lawmakers ought to consider the social
utility of the activity causing the recharge impact. If that activity is otherwise
highly valuable, then some relaxing of recharge obligations might be
appropriate.303 Second, historic practices and reliance interests ought to
matter;304 lawmakers might reasonably impose different recharge obligations
on a proposed new activity in a floodplain than on a community that has
occupied that floodplain for decades. Third, and perhaps most importantly,
300. For a general discussion of the challenge of setting analytical baselines, see J.B. Ruhl &

301.
302.

303.

304.

James Salzman, Gaming the Past: The Theory and Practice of Historic Baselines in the
Administrative State, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2011).
See id. at 13-15 (discussing the challenges of choosing between “ancient” and “recent”
baselines).
See Dave Owen, Auctions, Taxes, and Air, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 64, 70-71 (2017). See
generally Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV. ENV’T L. REV.
91 (2011) (exploring multiple approaches to the challenge of allocating the burdens of
new regulatory instruments).
An example might be recharge impacts resulting from the restoration of degraded
forest landscapes. See Elliott et al., supra note 191, at 987, 991-92 (describing the
increasing water demand of a regenerating forest).
See, e.g., Ann M. Eisenberg, Just Transitions, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 275-85 (2019)
(describing the argument for assistance, in the context of decarbonization, to people
who have depended on the old legal regime).
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ethics often must give way to politics.305 If the only way to get a groundwaterrecharge regime in place is to minimize burdens upon existing landowners,
that may be preferable to having no regime at all.306 But fourth, and finally, the
presently prevalent approach, in which landowners can be asked to depart
from present conditions only if someone pays, has thin ethical justifications.
Those present conditions were not divinely ordained; instead, they often
reflect human-constructed legal regimes that allowed some property owners to
exploit collectively shared resources to the detriment of the rest of the public.
Continuing those practices need not and should not be a given.
C. The Instruments of Groundwater-Recharge Law
Even where groundwater-recharge law seems possible and normatively
justified, a third key question remains: How should it be done? Other existing
laws provide a wide variety of potential models,307 and this Subpart explores
which techniques would make sense. Again, it offers no single
recommendation; instrument choice instead should depend on the nature of
the goals of regulatory interventions, the nature of the practices being
regulated, and the actors involved. Nevertheless, this section does offer an
argument for the selective use of financial-incentive systems—like stormwater
utilities—that use impact fees to encourage more effective recharge
management.308
For groundwater-recharge law, the range of potential instruments is large.
Changes to property and tort doctrines might be one place to start; one could
eliminate the common-enemy rule or limit the ability of landowners to change
land-use practices and recover previously recharged water, and then leave
implementation to private litigation before judges. Many environmental law
regimes rely on evaluation and disclosure requirements, and such requirements
might lead to modest improvements in groundwater-recharge management.309
The Forest Service, for example, might establish more explicit and demanding
requirements for factoring groundwater recharge into forest-management
305. See, e.g., Ruhl & Salzman, supra note 300, at 2-4 (noting the political origins of “no net

loss” policies for wetlands).
306. The political challenges of achieving groundwater-pumping regulation, even in places

where it appears to be badly needed, counsel that these difficulties may be large. See, e.g.,
Leahy, supra note 22, at 39 (describing the long and difficult process of moving toward
statewide groundwater-use regulation in California).
307. For an accessible summary and classification of regulatory instruments, see James
Salzman, Teaching Supplement, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental Law:
The Five P’s, 23 DUKE ENV’T L. & POL’Y F. 363, 363-64 (2013).
308. See generally Brisman, supra note 125 (describing stormwater utilities).
309. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (requiring environmental-impact statements for “major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment”).
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planning and environmental-impact studies.310 Environmental and naturalresource laws also often establish best-management-practice requirements or
restrict problematic activities, and such prescriptive regulation also can (and
sometimes does) play a part in groundwater-recharge management.311 So, for
example, state and local land-use regulators might require developers to build
projects that will recharge most stormwater on-site312 or might restrict
particularly recharge-limiting agricultural practices.313
Each of these traditional approaches is likely to make sense in some
circumstances, and sometimes in combination. Information requirements, for
example, might be an effective mechanism for gently and gradually pushing
federal land managers to take recharge management into account.314 Likewise,
best-management-practice requirements often make sense if regulators generally
understand that a practice—perhaps using pervious pavement for new
construction, for example—is effective at enhancing recharge, but those
regulators lack the resources to establish and then monitor compliance with sitespecific performance standards.315 But one particular regulatory instrument holds
special promise in this realm. That mechanism uses impact fees to deter negative
impacts on recharge and to create an aggregated pool of funding, which then can
support collective efforts at further recharge protection or management.
This basic model already exists in the realm of groundwater-recharge
management (and in some other areas of environmental regulation, for it is a
close cousin to Pigovian taxation316), and municipal stormwater utilities are

310. See Martin Nie & Michael Fiebig, Managing the National Forests Through Place-Based

311.

312.
313.
314.

315.

316.

Legislation, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 5, 11-13 (2010) (explaining the planning framework of
national forest-management laws, as well as the flexibility that this framework allows).
E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1329(b)(2)(A) (requiring the development of best management practices
for managing nonpoint-source pollution). See generally Eric Biber & J.B. Ruhl, The
Permit Power Revisited: The Theory and Practice of Regulatory Permits in the Administrative
State, 64 DUKE L.J. 133 (2014) (describing a wide variety of permit programs).
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
See Vira et al., supra note 222, at 121, 135 (describing South Africa’s permitting
requirements for tree plantations).
In theory, this could happen under existing law, and perhaps some environmental
studies do address recharge in thoughtful and useful ways. But I could not find any
cases in which the U.S. Forest Service’s consideration of recharge impacts was a
litigated issue.
For evaluation and discussion of a range of best-management practices for urban
stormwater, see generally U.S. EPA, EPA-821-R-99-012, PRELIMINARY DATA SUMMARY
OF URBAN STORM WATER BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES (1999), https://perma.cc/
B8MV-ZJEX.
See Scharff, supra note 126, at 195-209 (providing a definition of Pigovian tax and
comparing Pigovian taxes and Pigovian fees).
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the clearest example of this approach.317 A typical stormwater utility collects
fees from landowners in its service area.318 The amount of the fee depends on
the amount of impervious cover on the landowner’s property, with potential
fee offsets if the landowner installs stormwater-infiltrating features that
counteract the impacts of that impervious cover.319 The funds produced by the
fees support maintenance of existing stormwater infrastructure, but they can
also support projects that reduce runoff and enhance recharge, and municipal
stormwater managers can select the projects that they think will produce the
highest-value return at the lowest cost.320
This regulatory model has several key advantages. First, it addresses the
common regulatory challenge of dealing with collectively significant problems
that arise from actions that seem individually insignificant.321 Those problems
are often quite difficult to address, partly because individual actors do not
understand the connections between their small actions and the larger problem
that results and also because regulating the behavior of many small actors can
create major coordination challenges.322 The stormwater-utility model
navigates those challenges by asking each actor to make a contribution—often a
fairly modest one—to a collective and coordinated response.323 Second, this
model offers fairness. It requires everyone who contributes to a watermanagement challenge to contribute to the response, but it tailors the degree of
obligation to each individual landowner’s degree of contribution.324 Third, this
regulatory model preserves flexibility. A facility that really needs its impervious
surfaces still can have them; it just has to pay larger impact fees.

317. See id. at 205-06. See generally Brisman, supra note 125 (providing a general discussion of

stormwater utilities).
318. See, e.g., Stormwater Service Charge, PORTLAND, ME, https://perma.cc/4P2R-GPND

(archived Mar. 12, 2021).
319. See Stormwater Billing, PORTLAND, ME, https://perma.cc/7QBE-EQYG (archived

320.
321.

322.
323.
324.

Mar. 12, 2021) (explaining how bills are calculated); Stormwater Credits, PORTLAND, ME,
https://perma.cc/JS8V-UUZF (archived Mar. 12, 2021); Brisman, supra note 125, at 52427 (describing several cities’ credit programs).
See Owen et al., supra note 130, at 29 & n.9.
See Kevin M. Stack & Michael P. Vandenbergh, The One Percent Problem, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 1385, 1386-89 (2011) (describing the prevalence of large problems arising from
accumulations of small actions); Owen, supra note 35, at 143-44 (describing the
importance of these problems to environmental law).
See Stack & Vandenbergh, supra note 321, at 1393-402; Odum, supra note 89, at 729
(describing the need for, and pressures against, “holistic” thinking).
See Brisman, supra note 125, at 517 (describing rate structures).
See For Residents, PORTLAND, ME, https://perma.cc/F9HV-9X2T (archived Mar. 12,
2021) (arguing that a stormwater charge is a more equitable way of allocating the
financial burdens of stormwater management); Brisman, supra note 125, at 516-17.
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A key question, then, is whether and how this type of model might be
deployed to address other recharge-management challenges. Floodplains
provide one potential opportunity. If landowners in levee-protected floodplain
areas were charged groundwater-recharge impact fees, the fees might create an
additional deterrent to floodplain construction, and authorities might then use
those fees for selective buyouts of flood-prone areas, perhaps allowing them to
become recharge zones again. Similarly, in areas where new timbermanagement or cropping patterns will diminish recharge, regulators might
again impose impact fees, which they might use to support recharge-enhancing
practices elsewhere in the watershed. The model also can use payments rather
than fees.325 Suppose, for example, that a city’s water supply depends on
forested lands traditionally managed for timber harvesting and recreation.
That city could develop a groundwater-recharge fund, which would pay
landowners for prescribed burning, invasive-species removal, or other
recharge-promoting activities, with the understanding that the city will then
hold rights to the resulting enhanced flows.326
These types of fee- or payment-based models will not make sense in all
circumstances. Like any effort to commodify the value of land-use changes,
they will require reasonably accurate accounting methods, lest users wind up
paying for or receiving credit for recharge that the land-use changes never
actually produce.327 That reasonably accurate information isn’t always
available.328 Fee- or payment-based models also do not avoid difficult questions
about ethics and fairness. Deciding who should pay or be paid, and how much,
requires thinking through difficult questions about the extent to which people
are entitled to alter land even when those alterations adversely affect the
interests of others.329 Our systems of property and regulatory law generally
reject both “as much as you want” and “not at all” as answers to that question,
325. See Carolyn Kousky & Sarah E. Light, Insuring Nature, 69 DUKE L.J. 323, 347-50 (2019)
326.

327.

328.
329.

(describing “[p]ayments for ecosystem services”).
See generally LATIN AM. WATER FUNDS P’SHIP, WATER FUNDS: CONSERVING GREEN
INFRASTRUCTURE; A GUIDE FOR DESIGN, CREATION AND OPERATION (2012),
https://perma.cc/G5J2-MCKP (describing water funds, which use a similar model).
The literature on compensatory mitigation often identifies this problem. See Martin
W. Doyle & F. Douglas Shields, Compensatory Mitigation for Streams Under the Clean
Water Act: Reassessing Science and Redirecting Policy, 48 J. AM. WATER RES. ASS’N 494,
495-96 (2012) (finding that stream-mitigation projects routinely failed to deliver
promised environmental benefits); Margaret A. Palmer & Kelly L. Hondula, Restoration
as Mitigation: Analysis of Stream Mitigation for Coal Mining Impacts in Southern
Appalachia, 48 ENV’T SCI. & TECH. 10552, 10558 (2014) (same).
See generally Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 1,
20-22 (2011) (describing pervasive data gaps in environmental-monitoring programs).
See John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus Paying Land Owners to Protect the Environment,
26 J. LAND RES. & ENV’T L. 1, 31-33 (2005).
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but there are many possible points on the spectrum in between330—and, as the
previous Subpart discussed, many plausible ways of setting the baseline.331
Finally, just because fees make sense in both economic and fairness terms does
not always make them politically palatable. People often don’t understand
what the fee is paying for, and even when they do, opposition to fee-based
regulatory systems can be intense.332
Nevertheless, the fact that fee-based models will be impractical in some places
and unpalatable in others should not detract attention from their possibilities. No
regulatory model is perfect, and most regulation—even badly needed regulation—
can be unpopular. In places where improved groundwater recharge requires some
legal intervention, they offer a particularly promising approach.
Conclusion
Climate is always variable, but recent years have brought particularly
dramatic fluctuations—and also harbingers of the future—to the United States.
Droughts have battered much of the American West, but interspersed between
those drought years have been some of the wettest winters on record.
Groundwater storage is crucially important for mitigating the effects of these
extremes. But much of the West, and indeed much of the world, has given little
attention to the laws that affect water’s pathways into aquifers. And many of
the legal regimes that incidentally impact groundwater recharge are
counterproductive.
This Article has argued for more intentional laws governing groundwater
recharge. Those laws will not be needed everywhere, nor will they be easy to
design or implement. Challenges of information, coordination, ethics, and
instrument design will be significant, and the politics of any new body of
regulatory law can be difficult. But similar challenges arise, and have been at
least partially surmounted, in many other fields of environmental and naturalresource law. The severity of our coming water-management challenges will
require similar efforts for groundwater recharge.

330. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 & n.7 (1992) (stating that land-

use regulations that deprive owners of all economically viable use of property are
takings); Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (noting the government’s
power to restrict some property uses).
331. See supra notes 300-06 and accompanying text.
332. See Owen, supra note 105, at 1609 (noting political opposition to stormwater fees in
Maryland).
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